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The Media in the Courtroom:
Attending, Reporting, Televising Criminal Casest
PAUL MARCUS*
[FIree speech and fair trials are two of the most cherished policies
of our civilization, and it would be a trying task to choose letween
them.'
Americans have always been fascinated by the criminal trial,2 as
demonstrated by the enormously successful novels,3 plays,' films, 5 and
television shows' based on these trials. Criminal trials, however, are not
only the subject of popular forms of entertainment; they are news.
Whether the public is involved nationally in a case, such as the Patty
Hearst or Richard Speck trial, or only locally, the public's interest in the
criminal trial is great.7 As Justice Douglas stated: "A trial is a public
t Copyright 1982 by Paul Marcus.
* A.B. 1968, J.D. 1971, University of California at Los Angeles. Professor of Law, Univer-
sity of Illinois. This article is a considerably revised and expanded version of a lecture
given on October 9, 1981, at Indiana University School of Law at Bloomington. Funds for
the lecture were provided by the Addison C. Harris Fund. The excellent research assistance
of Catherine Wiegand, University of Illinois College of Law, class of 1982, is gratefully
acknowledged. I also wish to thank my friend and colleague, Professor John E. Nowak,
for his review of an early draft of this article.
' Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 260 (1941).
2 While the public may well be quite concerned with the criminal trial, most criminal
cases do not go to trial. As has been consistently pointed out, the vast majority of criminal
cases are disposed of either through dismissal by the prosecution or through a guilty plea
arrangement. See Stephenson, Fair Trial, Fair Press: Rights in Continuing Conflict, 46
BROOKLYN L. REV. 39, 39 n.5 (1979). Still, when one thinks of the criminal justice system, it
is the trials of people such as Charles Manson, Jean Harris, or the ABSCAM defendants
which immediately come to mind.
E.g., J. D. VOELKER, ANATOMY OF A MURDER (1958), an intense account of a murder trial.
E.g., M. LEVIN, COMPULSION (1957) (based upon Leopold and Loeb trial).
E.g., INHERIT THE WIND (1960), AND JUSTICE FOR ALL (1979).
6 Television has perhaps been the most widely used medium. Films appearing on televi-
sion have ranged from stories of nationally known trials, e.g. HELTER-SKELTER (Charles Man-
son Family case), to cases involving particularly violent crimes such as rapes, to proceedings
concerning incompetent defendants, e.g., DUMMY (story of Donald Lang).
" This interest can remain for considerable periods of time. It would appear that the
interest in the Bruno Hauptmann case has never died. The defendant there was convicted
of kidnapping and murdering the Lindbergh child. Questions are still being raised as to
whether the defendant received a fair trial and whether he actually committed the crimes
as charged. On October 6, 1981, Governor Brendan T. Byrne of New Jersey announced
that secret files maintained on the case would be opened in response to claims that an
innocent man was executed in the "crime of the century." Sullivan, Byrne to Release Lind-
bergh Files, 49 Years After the Kidnapping, N.Y. Times, Oct. 7, 1981, S B, at 1, col. 4. For
good discussions of the Hauptmann case, see Portman, The Defense of Fair Trial from Shep-
pard to Nebraska Press Association: Benign Neglect to Affirmative Action and Beyond, 29
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event. What transpires in the court room is public property. 8
The interest of the media in criminal trials is among the "purest" in
the press or speech arena. In such trials one need not be concerned with
reporting which tends to incite,9 is offensive to the general public, 10 may
unfairly injure reputation," or involves purely private activities.12 The
reporting of the criminal trial is factual, usually timely, and invariably
newsworthy. As a result, the courts have taken great pains to ensure
that any interference with media reporting of the criminal trial is minimal.
The difficulty is that the public interest-albeit entitled to great weight-
may not be the only interest present when a person stands to be deprived
of his or her liberty through the criminal justice system. There are also
interests in a fair trial, the rehabilitation of the accused, and the privacy
of the witnesses and victims.
While consistently recognizing the news content of criminal trials, courts
have been faced in recent years with a barrage of claims asking for limita-
tion of media coverage of criminal trials. The Supreme Court has explored
the claims in some detail in three principle areas: first, the reporting of
certain facts in a trial, such as the names of the defendants or witnesses;
second, the proposed limitation of attendance by media representatives
at pretrial or trial proceedings; and third, the electronic broadcasting of
criminal trials to the public. In this article I will initially, explore the strong
first amendment basis for media coverage of criminal trials. I will then
consider these three areas as they converge with the first amendment
interest in news gathering. My conclusion is that by recognizing this strong
first amendment interest, the Supreme Court has treated the media with
great deference, perhaps too much deference vis-A-vis certain defendants
as well as witnesses and victims.
THE FIRST AMENDMENT INTEREST
Few would argue with Thomas Jefferson's famous remark, "Our liberty
depends on freedom of the press, and that cannot be limited without be-
ing lost."'3 As the Supreme Court said in one of the most famous first
amendment cases ever decided, the United States has "a profound na-
tional commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should
be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open .... ."" The first amendment principle
STAN L. REV. 393 (1977); Seidman, The Trial and Execution of Bruno Richard Hauptmann: Still
Another Case that "Will Not Die", 66 GEO. L.J. 1 (1977).Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 374 (1947).
See generally Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) (conspiracy); Terminiello
v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949) ("fighting words").
" See generally Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (obscenity).
" See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (defamation).
2 See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967) (invasion of privacy).
,s 9 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 239 (J. Boyd ed. 1954).
, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). In Sullivan the Court held
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of free and open speech is readily accepted, and few restrictions will
generally be allowed."5 The difficulty of applying this basic notion in the
criminal context is that the criminal defendant often vigorously argues
that the principles of free speech conflict with his own personal right
to a fair trial attended by due process. Such a claim has been with this
country from its earliest roots. The defense lawyer for Aaron Burr claimed
that jurors could not properly decide the 1807 case because of prejudicial
articles carried in numerous newspapers.18 Chief Justice Marshall was
careful to consider the defendant's claims: "The jury should enter upon
the trial with minds open to those impressions which the testimony and
the law of the case ought to make, not with those preconceived opinions
which will resist those impressions."'1
7
While understanding the potential dangers to the workings of the
criminal justice system, the courts have been consistently vigilant in
upholding press rights when arguably in conflict with the rights of the
defendant. Judges have stressed the great values served by media report-
ing of criminal trials. The Supreme Court has stated: "The press does
not simply publish information about trials but guards against the miscar-
riage of justice by subjecting the police, prosecutors, and judicial pro-
cesses to extensive public scrutiny and criticism."'" Similarly, Justice
Brennan has written:
Commentary and reporting on the criminal justice system is at the
core of First Amendment values, for the operation and integrity of
that system is of crucial import to citizens concerned with the ad-
ministration of government. Secrecy of judicial action can only breed
ignorance and distrust of courts and suspicion concerning the com-
petence and impartiality of judges; free and robust reporting, criticism,
and debate can contribute to public understanding of the rule of law
and to comprehension of the functioning of the entire criminal justice
system, as well as improve the quality of that system by subjecting
it to the cleansing effects of exposure and public accountability.'9
In spite of continued media criticism and skepticism concerning the
judiciary's view of the so-called free press versus fair trial issue,0 the
that the Constitution requires public officials in defamation cases to prove that the state-
ment of the defendant had been published with actual malice-knowledge of the falsity
or reckless disregard for the truth. The doctrine was later expanded to cover public figures
as well. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
" For excellent discussions of the first amendment policy considerations, see Kalven,
The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning of the First Amendment", 1964
Sup. CT. REV. 191; Nimmer, TheRight to SpeakFrom Times to Time:First Amendment Theory
Applied to Libel and Misapplied to Privacy, 56 CAL. L. REV. 935 (1968).
" United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 49, 49 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692g).
'7 Id. at 50. See Report of the Committee on the Operation of the Jury System on the "Free
Press-Fair Trial" Issue, 45 F.R.D. 391, 394 n.2 (1968).
Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350 (1966).
" Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 587 (1976) (Brennan J., concurring).
= Consider for instance, the comments of well-known journalist Bob Woodward as quoted
1982]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
record of the courts in this regard has generally been impressive. A good
example of the courts' attention to this matter is the ABSCAM cases." In
several of these cases, media representatives have asked that the tapes,
which were shown to the jury,' be turned over to the media so that they
could be shown on television news. The defendants have argued
strenuously that the tapes, if shown to the public, could prejudice jury
pools available for the cases or for retrials, and have contended that a
delay in showing them on television would not seriously infringe first
amendment rights. The courts have consistently rejected the defendants'
claims.' Judges in these cases have recognized the defendants' interests,
yet have stressed that these interests must be balanced against the public
interest in immediately seeing matters of such great import.24
This is not to suggest that courts do not restrict the media in the report-
ing of criminal trials. There have been numerous instances of restrictions.
Nevertheless, these have been in relatively narrow and unusual cir-
cumstances. For instance, hearings on pretrial evidentiary matters may
in Stephenson, supra note 2, at 66: "'ITihere is an intense perception within the Court
that the press is operating outside the public interest, that it is the big guy, the bully.'
If the press will not police itself ... 'then somebody else will, and the ... Supreme Court
is poised and anxious to do so.'"
21 "'ABSCAM' [is] a coined word from the first two letters of Abdul Enterprises, Ltd.
and the word 'scam'...." In re Application of Nat'l Broadcasting Co., 635 F.2d 945, 947
(2d Cir. 1980). Abdul Enterprises was the fictional business used in the FBI's "sting" opera-
tion. Id.
Or in some cases, which were to be shown to the jury at a later time.
In re Application of Nat'l Broadcasting Co., 653 F.2d 609 (D.C. Cir. 1981); United States
v. Criden, 648 F.2d 814 (3d Cir. 1981); In re Application of Nat'l Broadcasting Co., 635 F.2d
945 (2d Cir. 1980).
24 The trial judge in the District of Columbia Circuit case had rejected the broadcasters'
position:
In denying the broadcasters' application the court relied primarily upon the
defendants' interest in securing a fair and impartial jury should their cases
be retried. The court noted that several defense motions were pending before
it which the court characterized as "not frivolous." If new trials were granted,
the court stated, release of the tapes would jeopardize the defendants' rights
because (1) the broadcasters probably would play portions of the tapes at or
near the beginning of any retrial, accompanied by references to the prior ver-
dicts and the court's rulings on the defendants' motions and (2) the broad-
casters probably would not play the tapes in their entirety, due to time restric-
tions, but would air only selected portions of the tapes in a manner presenting
the defendants in the most unfavorable light.
In re Application of Nat'l Broadcasting Co., 653 F.2d 609, 614-15 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (footnotes
omitted). The appeals court disagreed:
Although the trial court characterized the motions filed ... as "nonfrivolous",
the prospect of a retrial remains speculative. We accordingly still remain wary
of sanctioning denial of a posttrial application to copy and inspect judicial
records based on the pendency of new trial requests that may ultimately be
denied, although they cannot be dismissed at the threshold as frivolous. This
is not a case where the court has indicated it is inclined to grant a new trial.
Furthermore, should the presently hypothetical second trial become a reality,
we find nothing in the record to indicate that there would be significant dif-
ficulty in assembling a panel of the "impartial, 'indifferent' jurors" to which
[Vol. 57:235
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be closed to the press and the public.' Moreover, in contrast to the
ABSCAM cases, some trial judges refuse the media physical access to
items of evidence. In United States v. Gurney,26 the widely publicized trial
of the former United States Senator, the media were 'denied access to
"(1) exhibits not yet admitted into evidence; (2) transcripts of bench con-
ferences held in camera; (3) written communications between the jury
and the judge; (4) list of names and addresses of jurors; and (5) Mr.
Gurney's grand jury testimony."" Recognizing that the trial judge could
not restrain news coverage of the public trial or deny the media access
to any information already within the public domain, the court of appeals
affirmed the district judge's ruling since he had "merely refused to allow
the appellants to inspect documents not a matter of public record."28
Quoting from Chief Justice Warren's concurring opinion in the Billie Sol
Estes case,' the court noted that "'[wihen representatives of the com-
munications media attend trials they have no greater rights than other
members of the public.'"" The basic notion of Gurney was established
in the Richard Nixon tapes case, Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc."1
There, too, the media had asked to be able to make copies of items which
had never been made physically available to the public. The Court
specifically reaffirmed its first amendment holdings in the area of the
criminal trial and repeated the words of Justice Black that the public
trial is "'a safeguard against any attempt to employ our courts as in-
struments of persecution."'32 Nevertheless, the Court refused the media
access to the tapes:
[Tihe press ... was permitted to listen to the tapes and report on
the defendants would be constitutionally entitled .... We ... think it likely
... that a significant percentage of the potential jury pool will not see or
hear the tapes, or if they do, will quickly forget much of what they saw. In
the words of the Second Circuit, we think there is somewhat of a tendency
to "frequently overestimate the extent of the public's awareness of news".
Id. at 616 (footnotes omitted). But see In re Application of KSTP Television, 504 F. Supp.
360 (D. Minn. 1980). In KSTP, the judge refused to release to television stations videotape
recordings of the kidnapper and his victim which had been shown at trial. The court recog-
nized the "general right to inspect and copy public records," id. at 361, but found that
the public release of the tapes would infringe on the victim's privacy. The court distinguished
the ABSCAM cases because of the public interest in the tapes shown there. Id. at 363.
See also Belo Broadcasting Corp. v. Clark, 654 F.2d 423 (5th Cir. 1981) (refusing access
to tapes in "Brilab" sting operation case).
Capital Newspapers Div. of Hearst Corp. v. Clyne, 82 A.D.2d 963, 440 N.Y.S.2d 779
(1981) (mem.); see text accompanying notes 95-178 infra.
" 558 F.2d 1202 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied sub nom. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v.
Krentzman, 435 U.S. 968 (1978).
Id. at 1207.
" Id. at 1208.
Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 584 (1965) (Warren, C.J., concurring).
558 F.2d at 1208 n.9.
3, 435 U.S. 589 (1978).
Id. at 610 (quoting In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270 (1948)).
19821
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what was heard. Reporters also were furnished transcripts of the tapes,
which they were free to comment upon and publish .... Thus, the
issue presented in this case is not whether the press must be permit-
ted access to public information to which the public generally is
guaranteed access, but whether these copies of the White House
tapes-to which the public has never had physical access-must be
made available for copying ...
The First Amendment generally grants the press no right to infor-
mation about a trial superior to that of the general public.'
Thus, the courts will not hesitate to impose some curbs on the ability
of the media to report the criminal trial. Still, these curbs are imposed
in relatively rare cases where the public's right to know the circumstances
of the trial will not be affected. The courts may be unwilling in some
cases to give up videotapes; they are not willing to issue orders restrict-
ing press coverage or barring media representatives from the criminal
trial. When the claim of restrictions on the substantive news is raised,
the press normally prevails.
PRETRIAL PUBLICITY
The allegiance of the courts to the media interest has been demonstrated
quite saliently in several areas, but nowhere as significantly as in the
pretrial publicity cases. The argument of the defendants in these cases
is deceptively simple. The Constitution guarantees the defendant a fair
and public trial in which the state's case will be evaluated by a jury of
impartial citizens. In cases in which substantial publicity develops after
the incident in question but before the trial, members of the jury pool
may become so inundated with information that they cannot fairly review
the evidence. Such a claim, if proven, would indicate a constitutional viola-
tion. "A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process."'
"The theory of the law is that a juror who has formed an opinion cannot
be impartial."' '35
Few experienced lawyers and judges doubt that the defense claim is
correct, at least in some cases. Justice Brennan stated: "No one can
seriously doubt, however, that uninhibited prejudicial pretrial publicity
may destroy the fairness of a criminal trial ..... 1 A committee of federal
judges chaired by the Honorable Irving R. Kaufman remarked: "[Tjhe Com-
' 435 U.S. at 609. But see United States ex rel. Latimore v. Sielaff, 561 F.2d 691 (7th
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1076 (1978). In Sielaff spectators were excluded during
a rape victim's testimony at trial, but members of the media were allowed to attend.
Upholding this ruling, the court of appeals emphasized the trauma to the victim and the
lack of any harm to the defendant or the general public.
In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955).
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 155 (1878).
3 Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 587 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring).
[Vol. 57:235
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mittee cannot ignore the fact that it has become increasingly apparent
that in a widely publicized or sensational case, the right of the accused
to trial by an impartial jury can be seriously threatened by the conduct
of news media prior to and during trial."'3 In his concurring opinion in
Irvin v. Dowd,- Justice Frankfurter warned that "such extraneous in-
fluences, in violation of the decencies guaranteed by our Constitution,
are sometimes so powerful that an accused is forced, as a practical mat-
ter, to forego trial by jury." 9
During the 1960's, at a time when the Supreme Court was carefully
construing constitutional rights of the accused at trial, 0 the Court was
faced with numerous cases in which strong defense claims were made
with respect to prejudicial pretrial publicity. Three of these cases, in par-
ticular, were to guide lawyers and judges.41 In Irvin v. Dowd' residents
of a small town received an incredible amount of inflammatory publicity
about the defendant for a six-month period prior to trial, including: defen-
dant's confession to burglaries and murders (made public by an official
press release), information as to prior convictions of the defendant, and
his offer to plead guilty to avoid the death penalty, an offer which was
turned down by the government. The trial judge granted a defense mo-
tion for a change of venue, but under state statute the change could only
be to an adjacent county which had received basically the same news
coverage. Defense counsel was able to show bitter citizen prejudice against
the defendant. 3 Four-hundred thirty persons were called for jury service
" Report on the Committee on the Operation of the Jury System on the "Free Press-Fair
Trial" Issue, supra note 17, at 394.
366 U.S. 717, 729-30 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
Id. at 730.
42 During this period the Court decided the following cases: United States v. Wade, 388
U.S. 218 (1967) (defendant entitled to counsel at postindictment lineup); Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436 (1966) (fifth amendment requires substantial warnings to accused undergoing
custodial interrogation); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (sixth amendment right
to counsel applies to states); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (exclusionary rule applies
to states in fourth amendment search and seizure cases).
" The list of important pretrial publicity cases could be far longer. See, e.g., Murphy
v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794 (1975) (conviction affirmed where 20 veniremen indicated belief
of defendant's guilt; no showing of community "poisoned" against defendant); Marshall v.
United States, 360 U.S. 310 (1959) (defendant's conviction reversed because seven sitting
jurors exposed to news accounts of defendant's prior convictions and arrests); Stroble v.
California, 343 U.S. 181 (1952) (conviction affirmed where defendant failed to show that
publicity was such as to "necessarily prevent fair trial").
42 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
Id. at 720, 725-27. Sadly, this type of unfortunate atmosphere continues. In People
v. Botham, -Colo-, 629 P.2d 589 (1981), 89 jurors were explicitly questioned about
pretrial publicity in a case of widely reported homicides. Eighty-six of the 89 admitted
to seeing substantial news coverage of the story before being called as jurors. Fifty-seven
admitted that they felt, prior to trial, that the defendant was guilty as charged. Seven
of the 14 jurors called to hear the case believed, at one time or another, that the defendant
was guilty. Id at 599-600. The Colorado Supreme Court reversed the conviction, finding
that the "pattern of prejudice throughout the community could not be overcome by the
jurors' assurances of impartiality:' Id. at 600.
1982]
INDIANA LA W JOURNAL
at trial. Two-hundred sixty-eight were excused because they had made
up their minds with regard to guilt. Eight of the twelve who served as
jurors thought the defendant was guilty, but indicated that they could
nevertheless render an impartial verdict. One juror said, "You can't forget
what you hear and see."" The defendant's conviction was reversed. The
Court stated: "With his life at stake, it is not requiring too much that
petitioner be tried in an atmosphere undisturbed by so huge a wave of pub-
lic passion .... -4
Rideau v. Louisiana" involved a similar extreme situation. The defen-
dant there was a confessed bank robber who had killed a bank employee
during the course of the robbery. He was given the death sentence after
trial. The defendant's confession had been obtained in the jail where he
was being held the morning following the robbery and murder.17 "A local
television station had been allowed, perhaps invited, to videotape the con-
fession and the station then broadcast it to tens of thousands of members
of the community from which the jury was drawn."48 Without explicitly
finding any actual prejudicial impact on the jury itself,49 the Court reversed
the defendant's conviction. "Any subsequent court proceedings in a com-
munity so pervasively exposed to such a spectacle could be but a hollow
formality."'
No doubt the leading pretrial publicity case is Sheppard v. Maxwell.51
The defendant, a well-known Cleveland doctor, was charged with the
murder of his wife. During the investigation and the trial, the local
newspapers covered the story in detailed and inflammatory fashion. There
were daily headlines and editorials indicating the defendant's guilt. Reveal-
ing evidence from the state's case was presented, and public officials were
accused of "mollycoddling" the defendant. 5'2 Despite the fact that the
" 366 U.S. at 727-28.
" Id.The defendant had argued in a sweeping fashion that his conviction should be re-
versed simply because the public had received such a large amount of information about
him and about the case. This view the Court rejected:
It is not required, however, that the jurors be totally ignorant of the facts
and issues involved. In these days of swift, widespread and diverse methods
of communication, an important case can be expected to arouse the interest
of the public in the vicinity, and scarcely any of those best qualified to serve
as jurors will not have formed some impression or opinion as to the merits
of the case.
Id. at 722.
6 373 U.S. 723 (1963).
" Id. at 724-25.
"' Martin v. Warden, Huntingdon State Correctional Inst., 653 F.2d 799, 805 n.5 (3d
Cir. 1981) (discussing Rideau).
" Stephenson, supra note 2, at 49. For an interesting debate on the need for such a
finding, compare the majority and dissenting opinions in United States v. Poludniak, 657
F.2d 948 (8th Cir. 1981).
373 U.S. at 726.
s' 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
' Id. at 338-42. The Court described the rather incredible pretrial and trial situation:
[Vol. 57:235
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Supreme Court did not hear the case until twelve years later,' it ordered
a new trial for the defendantl The Court found that "this deluge of
During the inquest ... a headline in large type stated: "Kerr [Captain of the
Cleveland Police] Urges Sheppard's Arrest." In the story, Detective McArthur
"disclosed that scientific tests at the Sheppard home have definitely established
that the killer washed off a trail of blood from the murder bedroom to the
downstairs section," a circumstance casting doubt on Sheppard's accounts of
the murder. No such evidence was produced at trial. The newspapers also
delved into Sheppard's personal life. Articles stressed his extramarital love
affairs as a motive for the crime. The newspapers portrayed Sheppard as a
Lothario, fully explored his relationship with Susan Hayes, and named a number
of other women who were allegedly involved with him. The testimony at trial
never showed that Sheppard had any illicit relationships besides the one with
Susan Hayes.
On July 28, an editorial entitled "Why Don't Police Quiz Top Suspect"
demanded that Sheppard be taken to police headquarters. It described him
in the following language:
"Now proved under oath to be a liar, still free to go about his
business, shielded by his family, protected by a smart lawyer who
has made monkeys of the police and authorities, carrying a gun
part of the time, left free to do whatever he pleases .. "
A front-page editorial on July 30 asked: "Why Isn't Sam Sheppard in Jail?"
It was later titled "Quit Stalling-Bring Him In."
... Twenty-five days before the case was set, 75 veniremen were called
as prospective jurors. All three Cleveland newspapers published the names
and addresses of the veniremen. As a consequence, anonymous letters and
telephone calls, as well as calls from friends, regarding the impending pro-
secution were received by all of the prospective jurors.
... On the sidewalk and steps in front of the courthouse, television and
newsreel cameras were occasionally used to take motion pictures of the par-
ticipants in the trial, including the jury and the judge. Indeed, one television
broadcast carried a staged interview of the judge as he entered the courthouse.
In the corridors outside the courtroom there was a host of photographers and
television personnel with flash cameras: portable lights and motion picture
cameras. This group photographed the prospective jurors during selection of
the jury. After the trial opened, the witnesses, counsel, and jurors were
photographed and televised whenever they entered or left the courtroom.
Id. at 340-44.
- After the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed Sheppard's conviction, State v. Sheppard,
165 Ohio St. 293, 135 N.E.2d 340 (1956), the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari,
352 U.S. 910 (1956. Eight years later the United States district court found, on a writ
of habeas corpus, that Sheppard had been denied due process. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 231
F. Supp. 37 (S.D. Ohio 1964). The court of appeals reversed, 346 F.2d 707 (6th Cir. 1965),
allowing the United States Supreme Court to grant certiorari and affirm the granting of
the writ by the district court.
I As the Third Circuit properly pointed out, the Supreme Court in Sheppard did not
"'say that Sheppard was denied due process by the judge's refusal to take precautions
against the influence of pretrial publicity alone' ..... [Riather the Court ordered that a
writ of habeas corpus issue because the trial judge permitted bedlam to reign at the trial,
failed to prevent serious disruptive influences in the court, and allowed the intrusion of
the media on the deliberative processes occurring in the courtroom." Martin v. Warden,
Huntingdon State Correctional Inst., 653 F.2d 799, 805 n.5 (3d Cir. 1981) (citation ommitted)
(quoting Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 354 (1966)).
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publicity reached at least some of the jury"55 and that "bedlam reigned
at the courthouse during the trial and newsmen took over practically the
entire courtroom ... ,"6 The Court57 chastised the trial judge for failing
to protect the defendant's rights. It suggested several protective measures:
first, limiting the number of reporters in the courtroom and regulating
their conduct;5 second, "insulating" the witnesses from public interviews;59
and third, making "some effort to control the release of leads, informa-
tion, and gossip to the press by police officers, witnesses, and the counsel
for both sides." 0 The Court added:
[W]here there is a reasonable likelihood that prejudicial news prior
to trial will prevent a fair trial, the judge should continue the case
until the threat abates, or transfer it to another county not so
permeated with publicity. In addition, sequestration of the jury was
something the judge should have raised sua sponte with counsel. If
publicity during the proceedings threatens the fairness of the trial,
a new trial should be ordered .... The courts must take such steps
by rule and regulation that will protect their processes from prejudicial
outside interferences. Neither prosecutors, counsel for defense, the ac-
cused, witnesses, court staff nor enforcement offwers coming under the
jurisdiction of the court should be permitted to frustrate its function.
Collaboration between counsel and the press as to information affec-
ting the fairness of a criminal trial is not only subject to regulation,
but is highly censurable and worthy of disciplinary measures.1
It is not enough for the defendant to show pretrial publicity. As later
noted, "pretrial publicity-even pervasive, adverse publicity-does not
inevitably lead to an unfair trial." 2 The ultimate question is narrow, as
stated in the Richard Speck case: "The basic consideration, however, is
not the amount of publicity in a particular case, but whether the defen-
dant in that case received a fair and impartial trial . . . ."' The courts'
' 384 U.S. at 357. For a more recent version of this sort of pretrial publicity problem,
see Commonwealth v. Daugherty, 493 Pa. 273, 426 A.2d 104, 106 (1981).
384 U.S. at 355.




"I Id. at 363 (emphasis in original). The handling of the trial of Dr. George Nichopoulos,
Elvis Presley's doctor, who was charged with overprescribing drugs for Presley and others,
is instructive. In that case, the Memphis trial judge, cognizant of the immense publicity,
issued detailed and careful orders regulating the use of cameras and sound equipment in
the lobbies of the courtroom. N.Y. Times, Oct. 1, 1981, S A, at 16, col. 6.
"2 Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 554 (1976). In some cases there will
be no prejudice even with great pretrial publicity due to the passage of time between
the underlying incident and the court proceedings. In State v. Beavers, 394 So. 2d 1218(La. 1981), the crime was alleged to have been committed in January 1972. The testimony
showed that most coverage of the incident had died down in Baton Rouge following the
original trial in April 1973. Certainly, in 1980 (at the time of the retrial) evidence would
fail "to establish clearly the existence of such prejudice in the collective mind of the com-
munity as to make a fair trial impossible." Id. at 1225.
' People v. Speck, 41 Ill. 2d 177, 183, 242 N.E.2d 208, 212 (1968).
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adherence to this principle, as well as the general deference given to the
rights of the media in criminal cases, is demonstrated in the case which
arose after a trial judge attempted to eliminate all difficulties with pre-
judicial pretrial publicity.
NEBRASKA PRESS ASSOCIATION v. STUART
64
The state trial judge in Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart took the
Supreme Court's suggestions to heart and "acted responsibly, out of a
legitimate concern, in an effort to protect the defendant's right to a fair
trial." 5 The defendant was accused of murdering six members of a family
in a Nebraska town of about 850 people. The crime attracted widespread
news coverage, locally and nationwide. Three days after the crime, both
the prosecuting attorney and the defense counsel asked the trial court
to enter an order relating to "'matters that may or may not be publicly
reported or disclosed to the public' due to the "'mass coverage by news
media' and the 'reasonable likelihood of prejudicial news which would make
difficult, if not impossible, the impaneling of an impartial jury and tend
to prevent a fair trial."'68 After hearing argument, the judge entered an
order which prohibited all persons in attendance from "'releas[ing] or
authoriz[ing] the release for public dissemination in any form or manner
whatsoever any testimony given or evidence adduced.' "61 The Nebraska
Supreme Court altered the order somewhat,' but defended the restric-
tions which were being imposed because of the defendant's vital interest
in a trial by an impartial jury.9 The modified order prohibited reporting
of three items: first, confessions or admissions made by the defendant
to law enforcement officers; second, confessions or admissions made to
other persons (except members of the press); and third, other facts
"strongly implicative of the accused."7 The order expired when the jury
was impaneled.7
427 U.S. 539 (1976). For good discussions of the case, see NOWAK. ROTUNDA & YOUNG,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 765-67 (1978); Barnett, The Puzzle of Prior Restraint, 29 STAN. L. REV.
539 (1977); Schmidt, Nebraska Press Association: An Expansion of Freedom and Contrac-
tion of Theory, 29 STAN. L. REV. 431 (1977).
427 U.S. at 555.
Id. at 542.
', Id. The lower court, though not the state supreme court, also required members of
the press to observe the Nebraska bar-press guidelines, which were voluntary standards
adopted by members of the state bar and news media to deal with the reporting of crimes
in criminal trials. Id. at 542, 545, n.1. Members of the media expressed great skepticism
as to the likely result of this case when it reached the United States Supreme Court. See
note 99 infra.
" State v. Simants, 194 Neb. 783, 801, 236 N.W.2d 794, 805 (1975).
" Id at 799-801, 236 N.W.2d at 804-05.
70 Id. at 801, 236 N.W.2d at 805.
" 427 U.S. at 546. Though the order expired, the Court concluded that the case was
not moot because the defendant could be retried and because similar orders could be entered
in the State of Nebraska. Id. at 546-47.
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Chief Justice Burger, writing for the Court, began by noting that the
conflict between the right to a free press and the right to a fair trial
was "almost as old as the Republic." 2 After looking to the many pretrial
publicity cases, 3 he concluded that the cases showed that pretrial publicity,
even adverse publicity, would not necessarily lead to an unfair trial. In-
stead, it was the judge's responsibility to make sure that the jury im-
paneled could fairly and impartially resolve the issues in the case."
Balanced against this right to a fair trial was the constitutional restric-
tion against limitations on freedom of the press. The Court was especially
troubled by "orders that prohibit the publication or broadcast of particular
information or commentary- orders that impose a 'previous' or 'prior'
restraint on speech."' 5 After exploring earlier first amendment decisions,'
the Court concluded that "prior restraints on speech and publication are
the most serious and the least tolerable infringement on First Amend-
ment rights."" Although the Court refused to hold that prior restraints
on news agencies in criminal trials were per se unconstitutional, 8 it was
careful to evaluate the facts in the record to determine whether such
facts supported "the entry of a prior restraint on publication, one of the
most extraordinary remedies known to our jurisprudence. 7 9 Looking to
three important factors, the Court decided that the prior restraint in this
case was unjustified.
The first question was whether the trial judge was correct in deter-
mining that there would be intense pretrial publicity about the case. All
members of the Court had little trouble concluding that the trial judge
was right.' The news media were overwhelming the small Nebraska town,
subjecting the case to intense scrutiny and publicity. The next question
was whether measures other than a prior restraint would have reduced
the pretrial publicity. Placing the burden heavily on the state, the Court
found that there was no finding that alternatives would have failed to
protect the defendant's rights. The alternatives were change of venue,
" Id. at 547.
71 In particular, the Chief Justice considered the Irvin, Rideau, and Sheppard cases. Id.
at 551-55. For discussion of these cases, see text accompanying notes 42-61 supra.
427 U.S. at 554-55.
Id. at 556.
78 The Court relied heavily on Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 713 (1931)("[Ilt has been generally, if not universally, considered that it is the chief purpose of the[first amendment] to prevent previous restraints upon publication."), and on New York
Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). 427 U.S. at 556-62.
Id. at 559.
,8 Id. at 570. But see id. at 572-617 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment) (discussed
in text accompanying notes 75-79 infra). Media representatives argued strongly that a per
se rule should be adopted because of the large number of prior restraints and gag orders
which had been issued in response to adverse pretrial publicity claims. See 65 ILL. B.J.
469, 471 (1977).
427 U,S. at 562.
Id. at 562-63.
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postponement of the trial, substantial questioning of respective jurors,
and instructions to the jurors on their sworn duties." Additionally, the
Justices wondered how effective the restraining order in this case would
have been in preventing prejudicial publicity. Noting that the trial court
could not have jurisdiction over news agencies not physically present in
court, and further noting that areas not specified in the order might well
prove to be prejudicial, the Court found it unlikely that the judge's order
would have protected the defendant's rights.2
The Chief Justice stopped short of holding that a prior restraint order
could never be issued in connection with adverse pretrial publicity,' but
made clear that it would be the rare case in which such an order would
be constitutionally valid." In the instant case, the Court held:
[W]ith respect to the order entered in this case prohibiting reporting
or commentary on judicial proceedings held in public, the barriers
have not been overcome; to the extent that this order restrained
publication of such material, it is clearly invalid. To the extent that
it prohibited publication based on information gained from other
8, Id. at 563-65 (citing Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 357-62 (1966)). Justice Erickson
of the Colorado Supreme Court explores these alternatives in Erickson, Fair Trial and
Free Press: The Practical Dilemma, 29 STAN. L. REV. 485 (1977).
81 427 U.S. at 566-67. In addition, the Court expressed some question as to the impact
of media coverage as opposed to the normal rumor mill present in a small community.
In a community of 850 people, "rumors would travel swiftly by word of mouth [and] could
... be more damaging than reasonably accurate news accounts. But... a whole community
cannot be restrained .... Id. at 567. One commentator argues that pretrial publicity will
rarely affect the jury:
The short of my conclusions is that newspaper publicity, or any other asser-
tions of the facts of a case made outside of court, have virtually no impact
upon the jury trying the case. It is not that all jurors are without preju-
dice .... In deciding the case before them, however, the jurors almost in-
variably assumed as a matter important to their status that they knew more
about the facts of the case than any newspaper reporter and that their superior
understanding was due to their close observation of the trial itself. Moreover,
I have reason to believe that jurors, like most other Americans, mistrust the
accuracy of specific statements reported in the press and have a poor memory
for these things. They seem to be much more influenced by other jurors'
arguments, during deliberations, and generally the debates and social pressures
of deliberation determine the verdict.
Kaplan, Of Babies and Bathwater, 29 STAN. L. REV. 621,623 (1977). For excellent discussions
of the empirical evidence in this area, see Simon, Does the Court's Decision in Nebraska
Press Association Fit the Research Evidence on the Impact on Jurors of News Coverage?,
29 STAN. L. REV. 515 (1977); J. Buddenbaum, D. Weaver, R. Holsinger & C. Brown, Pretrial
Publicity and Juries: A Review of Research (Indiana University School of Journalism, March
1981).
The Chief Justice stated:
However difficult it may be, we need not rule out the possibility of showing
the kind of threat to fair trial rights that would possess the requisite degree
of certainty to justify restraint. This Court has frequently denied that First
Amendment rights are absolute and has consistently rejected the proposition
that a prior restraint can never be employed.
427 U.S. at 569-70.
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sources, we conclude that the heavy burden imposed as a condition
to securing a prior restraint was not met. . ..
The Chief Justice's opinion strongly reaffirmed the important first
amendment interest in the reporting of criminal trials in a timely and
unrestricted fashion. Still, other members of the Court had an even
stronger view of the first amendment guarantee, though they recognized
the important rights of the defendant to a fair trial. Justice White stated
that there was "grave doubt" in his mind "whether orders with respect
to the press such as were entered in this case would ever be justifiable."'
Justice Powell wrote:
In my judgment a prior restraint properly may issue only when
it is shown to be necessary to prevent the dissemination of prejudicial
publicity that otherwise poses a high likelihood of preventing, directly
and irreparably, the impaneling of a jury meeting the Sixth Amend-
ment requirement of impartiality. This requires a showing that (i) there
is a clear threat to the fairness of trial, (ii) such a threat is posed
by the actual publicity to be restrained, and (iii) no less restrictive
alternatives are available. Notwithstanding such a showing, a restraint
may not issue unless it also is shown that previous publicity or publicity
from unrestrained sources will not render the restraint inefficacious.
The threat to the fairness of the trial is to be evaluated in the con-
text of Sixth Amendment law on impartiality, and any restraint must
comply with the standards of specificity always required in the First
Amendment context.
' 7
The strongest position in favor of the media was taken by Jus-
tice Brennan, with whom Justices Stewart and Marshall joined. He began
by conceding that the right to a fair trial was "'the most fundamental
of all freedoms"' 88 and "essential to the preservation and enjoyment of
all other rights, providing a necessary means of safeguarding personal
liberties against government oppression," 9 and that "uninhibited pre-
judicial pretrial publicity may destroy the fairness of a criminal trial.""
Nevertheless, he concluded that courts cannot impose any prior restraints
''on the reporting of or commentary upon information revealed in open
court proceedings, disclosed in public documents, or divulged by other
sources with respect to the criminal justice system . . -."' As the Chief
Justice had written, Brennan found that there were numerous alternatives
to prior restraint. Justice Brennan did not find that there was any in-
" Id. at 570. See also Note, Prior Restraint on Media Publication to Protect Criminal
Trial Must Meet Strict Requirements, 25 U. KAN. L. REv. 258 (1977).
427 U.S. at 570.
Id. at 570-71 (White, J., concurring).
Id. at 571-72 (Powell, J., concurring).
Id. at 586 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 540 (1965)).
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herent conflict between the free press and fair trial rights,92 but he made
clear that the potential for harm resulting from prior restraints was great
and the interests of the first amendment were paramount in resolving
whatever conflict might exist:
Commentary and reporting on the criminal justice system is at the
core of First Amendment values, for the operation and integrity of
that system is of crucial import to citizens concerned with the ad-
ministration of government. Secrecy of judicial action can only breed
ignorance and distrust of courts and suspicion concerning the com-
petence and impartiality of judges; free and robust reporting, criticism,
and debate can contribute to public understanding of the rule of law
and to comprehension of the functioning of the entire criminal justice
system, as well as improve the quality of that system by subjecting
it to the cleansing effects of exposure and public accountability.93
Some may argue that the majority of the Court in Nebraska Press did
not go far enough in rejecting the notion of prior restraints in the pretrial
publicity cases even though all members of the Court heavily emphasized
the first amendment interest in news media coverage of criminal trials.
In the period immediately after the case numerous groups of lawyers,
judges, and journalists were formed to study the matter and all "defer-
red" to the first amendment interests by suggesting methods for the
elimination of potentially unfair pretrial publicity other than the prior
restraint. 4 With respect to the competing interest of the fair trial, the
9 But I would reject the notion that a choice is necessary, that there is an
inherent conflict that cannot be resolved without essentially abrogating one
right or the other.... For although there may in some instances be tension
between uninhibited and robust reporting by the press and fair trials for
criminal defendants, judges possess adequate tools short of injunctions against
reporting for relieving that tension.
Id. at 611-12.
1 Id. at 587. Justice Stevens chose not to answer the question of whether a per se rule
against prior restraints was required under the Constitution. He indicated, however, that
he subscribed to most of what Justice Brennan said and "if ever required to face the issues
squarely, [I] may well accept his ultimate conclusion." Id. at 617 (Stevens, J., concurring).
I See Stephenson, supra note 2, at 51-52. Typical of the study groups' approaches is
Standard 8-3.5 of 2 ABA STANDARD FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS (2d
ed. 1980), which provides as follows:
(a) If there is a substantial possibility that individual jurors will be inel-
igible to serve because of exposure to potentially prejudicial material, the ex-
amination of each juror with respect to exposure shall take place outside the
presence of other chosen and prospective jurors. An accurate record of this
examination shall be kept by court reporter or tape recording whenever pos-
sible. The questioning shall be conducted for the purpose of determining what
the prospective juror has read and heard about the case and how any exposure
has affected that person's attitude toward the trial, not to convince the pros-
pective juror that an inability to cast aside any preconceptions would be a
dereliction of duty.
(b) Both the degree of exposure and the prospective juror's testimony as
to state of mind are relevant to the determination of acceptability. A prospec-
tive juror testifying to an inability to overcome preconceptions shall be sub-
ject to challenge for cause no matter how slight the exposure. If the prospec-
1982]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
first amendment interest put forth by media representations has fared
well in the pretrial publicity cases, at least when confronted with prior
restraints. In very different areas the approaches taken by trial judges
have not been as extreme as in Nebraska Press. In these areas interests
other than the fair trial claim are powerfully asserted. Again, however,
the first amendment interest as manifested in free press access to criminal
trials normally fares quite well.
THE BALANCE OF COMPETING INTERESTS
A. Closing the Proceedings
After Nebraska Press it became apparent that a prior order restricting
coverage of the pretrial and trial proceedings would be difficult, if not
impossible, to obtain.95 On the other hand, the Court in Nebraska Press
had made clear that in many cases prejudicial pretrial publicity will
seriously and adversely affect the opportunity of the defendant to receive
a fair trial. The question then became: How should the courts proceed
with respect to protecting the defendant's interest without unduly restrict-
ing the news media coverage of the public event? The obvious answer
for many judges was to close portions of the proceedings. If closure were
successful, information available only during those proceedings would not
become generally available to the public. The argument in favor of closure
became particularly compelling when the news reports by the media
related to evidence which would be inadmissible at trial. Such inadmissible
evidence could include "the past criminal record of the defendant [and]
tive juror remembers information that will be developed in the course of the
trial, or that may be inadmissible but does not create a substantial risk of
impairing judgment, that person's acceptability shall turn on the credibility
of testimony as to impartiality. If the formation of an opinion is admitted,
the prospective juror shall be subject to challenge for cause unless the ex-
amination shows unequivocally the capacity to be impartial. A prospective
juror who has been exposed to and remembers reports of highly significant
information, such as the existence or contents of a confession, or other in-
criminating matters that may be inadmissible in evidence, or substantial
amounts of inflammatory material, shall be subject to challenge for cause
without regard to the prospective juror's testimony as to state of mind.
(c) Whenever there is a substantial likelihood that, due to pretrial publicity,
the regularly alotted number of peremptory challenges is inadequate, the court
shall permit additional challenges to the extent necessary for the impaneling
of an impartial jury.
(d) Whenever it is determined that potentially prejudicial news coverage
of a criminal matter has been intense and has been concentrated in a given
locality in a state (or federal district), the court shall have authority in jurisdic-
tions where permissible to draw jurors from other localities in that state (or
district).
9 Recall that in Nebraska Press it was not at all certain whether a majority said that
a prior restraint would ever be valid. See notes 86-93 & accompanying text supra.
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illegally seized evidence or confessions that . . .are constitutionally
inadmissible."9 This type of argument led to revised American Bar
Association standards allowing for the exclusion of the public from pretrial
as well as trial hearings which would normally be held outside the presence
of the jury.'
If the closure cases had been limited to cases in which it was vital for
the fairness of the trial to close the hearings,98 and if it was clear that
no alternative would solve the problem,99 the major constitutional debate
might not have occurred. The cases were not so limited. As Carl Stern,
NBC news correspondent and also an attorney, put it,
The courts were not placed outside the sort of public supervision that
lies at the very heart of self-government .... Yet, lawyers ... are
trained to think in terms of secrecy. [The lawyer's] first instinct is
Kaplan, Free Press/Fair Trial Rights in Conflict: Freedom of the Press and the Rights
of the Individual, 29 OKLA. L. REV. 361, 361-62 (1976).
1' 2 ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS, supra note 94,
at Standard 8-3.6(d). This standard provides:
If the jury is not sequestered, the defendant shall be permitted to move
that the public, including representatives of the news media, be excluded from
any portion of the trial that takes place outside the presence of the jury if:
(i) the dissemination of information from the hearing would pose a clear
and present danger to the fairness of the trial, and
(ii) the prejudicial effect of such information on the jurors cannot be avoided
by any reasonable alternative means. With the consent of the defendant, the
court may take such action on its own motion or at the suggestion of the pro-
secution. Whenever such action is taken, a complete record of the proceedings
from which the public has been excluded shall be kept and shall be made
available to the public following the completion of the trial or earlier if consis-
tent with trial fairness. Nothing in this recommendation is intended to interfere
with the power of the court, in connection with any hearing held outside the
presence of the jury, to caution those present that dissemination of specified
information by any means of public communication, prior to the rendering
of the verdict, may jeopardize the right to a fair trial by an impartial jury.
" In the terms of the ABA Standards, "a clear and present danger to the fairness of
the trial." Id.
" The obvious alternatives would be an intensive voir dire or a change of venue. For
views of the effectiveness of these techniques, compare the statements made by news cor-
respondent Carl Stern with those by law professor John Kaplan:
But right now there are very few barriers to a judge closing his courtroom
or moving a substantial portion of a proceeding into chambers.... The judges
say it happens only in controversial cases, and of course, that is true. But
it probably is the controversial ones (where the judges are most likely to im-
pose restraints) that are precisely the ones the public has the greatest need
and right to know about. ...
*.. The Task Force in which I participated found there was no reason to
close pretrial proceedings or to issue gag orders except in those rare cases
where the life of an informant or witness might be endangered. While the
voir dire may not be a perfect device, the evidence is persuasive that a jury
can be found in virtually every case that has not been influenced by pretrial
publicity. Most pretrial publicity occurs months before the actual date of trial
and has subsided or been dissipated in a swirl of conflicting accounts ....
I remember that in the Mitchell-Haldeman-Erlichman trial, approximately three
prospective jurors out of each 75-member panel swore they'd never even heard
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to ask to see the judge privately, to have some closed-door hearings.
•.. But what it all adds up to is that many lawyers still don't ap-
preciate that when a case gets down to a public courthouse, it is no
longer a private matter."
The question was put at issue in cases where it did not seem that closure
was essential to the fairness of the trial, or where reasonable alternatives
had not been attempted. In those cases the news media became concerned
that they were being closed out of the proceedings for no good reason.
In such cases,0 1 the media contended that they had a first amendment
right to attend the proceedings; this position led to the Court's decision
in Gannett Co. v. DePasquale. 1
2
The defendant in Gannett questioned whether the public has a "con-
stitutional right to ... access to a pretrial judicial proceeding, even though
the accused, the prosecutor and the trial judge all have agreed to the
closure of that proceeding in order to assure a fair trial."'0 3 The police
in a suburb of Rochester, New York, investigated the disappearance of
a man who seemed to have met a violent death. Two Rochester
of Watergate.. . ... Pretrial publicity may make it more expensive to select
a jury, more time-consuming perhaps; those are the tradeoffs we make in a
free society to keep the workings of our courts open.
Stern, Free Press/Fair Trial The Role of the News Media in Developing and Advancing Con-
stitutional Processes, 29 OKLA. L. REV. 349, 358 (1976).
[A] change of venue, in some cases, will work.... But in some cases it won't
.... I know of no persuasive evidence that voir dire will solve the problems
of reporting criminal records or illegaly seized evidence.... There were three
people, I believe, who, in the Watergate voir dire said they bad never heard
of Watergate. That is all very well, but it seems to me that just as we want
an unprejudiced jury, we want a jury that has no imbeciles....
So, this really is a problem, and it is not a problem where we can say, "Well,
there is a first amendment," because we happen to have a fifth amendment
with a due process clause, and we also have a sixth amendment which talks
about impartial juries. There is a flat conflict, and there is just simply no
way to get around it.
Kaplan, supra note 96, at 362.
" Stern, supra note 99, at 356. In a concurring opinion in Westchester Rockland
Newspapers, Inc. v. Leggett, 48 N.Y.2d 430, 446, 399 N.E.2d 518, 527, 423 N.Y.S.2d 630,
640 (1979), Chief Judge Cooke responded to a request for closure:
[Mierely because a pending prosecution has aroused public interest does not
lead inexorably to the conclusion that the fair trial rights of the defendant
would be irrevocably prejudiced, or even jeopardized, by reports of what has
transpired in pretrial proceedings. Such a conclusion would result in an unfor-
tunate paradox: the greater the interest in a particular prosecution, the more
apt the defendant to claim the possibility of prejudice and, concomitantly, the
more likely that the proceeding will be isolated from public scrutiny.
101 See, e.g., Stern, supra note 99, at 357; see generally Comment, Richmond Case Widens
Access, Spawns Doubts, 66 A.B.A.J. 946, 947 (1980).
"102 443 U.S. 368 (1979). For a good discussion of the case, see BeVier, An Informed Public,
An Informing Press: The Search for a Constitutional Principle, 68 CAL. L. REV. 482 (1980).
03 443 U.S. at 370-71. While the Court first pointed out that the district attorney simply
"did not oppose the motion," id. at 375, the opinion later went on to state that in the case
"the defendants, the prosecutor, and the judge all agreed that closure of the pretrial sup-
pression hearing was necessary to protect the defendants' right to a fair trial:' Id. at 382 n.ll.
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newspapers gave considerable coverage to the disappearance and the later
tracking down of the suspects in Michigan. Articles provided background
information on the victim's life and the manner in which it was thought
the victim had been killed. Coverage included the arraignment of the
defendants on murder charges, the indictment, and the defendants' pleas
of not guilty. The defendants moved to suppress statements on the ground
that they had been given involuntarily; they also attempted to suppress
evidence seized as fruits of the confessions. A hearing was scheduled by
the trial judge on the motions."4 At the hearing defense attorneys argued
that the adverse publicity in the newspaper stories had affected the ability
of the defendants to receive a fair trial. They requested that the public
and press be excluded from the hearings on the motions to suppress. The
district attorney did not oppose this request, and it was granted by the
trial judge.1 15 The trial judge stated, however, that in his view the press
had a constitutional right of access to the hearing, but that this right
"had to be balanced against the constitutional right of the defendants
to a fair trial." ' 6 Finding that an open hearing would pose a "reasonable
probability of prejudice to thes.e defendants,"'0 7 the judge ruled that "the
interest of the press and the public was outweighed in this case by the
defendants' right to a fair trial."'0 8
Writing for the Court,"9 Justice Stewart initially stressed the impor-
tant role of the trial judge in determining that the defendants' due pro-
cess rights were protected: "[A] trial judge has an affirmative constitu-
tional duty to minimize the effects of prejudicial pretrial publicity.""10 He
described why the trial judge's obligation was particularly important in
cases involving pretrial motions to suppress:
Publicity concerning pretrial suppression hearings such as the one
involved in the present case poses special risks of unfairness. The
whole purpose of such hearings is to screen out unreliable or illegally
obtained evidence and insure that this evidence does not become known
to the jury. Publicity concerning the proceedings at a pretrial hear-
ing, however, could influence public opinion against a defendant and
inform potential jurors of inculpatory information wholly inadmissible
at the actual trial.
The danger of publicity concerning pretrial suppression hearings
is particularly acute, because it may be difficult to measure with any
degree of certainty the effects of such publicity on the fairness of
10 Id. at 371-75. At least seven stories appeared in each of the two newspapers before
the pretrial motions were made. Id.
,05 Id. at 375.
' Id. at 376.
107 Id.
10$ Id.
100 Justice Stewart began his discussion by finding, as in Nebraska Press, that the dispute
was not moot, as it was one which was "'capable of repetition, yet evading review.'" Id.
at 377 (quoting Southern Pac. Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911)).
"I Id. at 378 (citation omitted).
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the trial. After the commencement of the trial itself, inadmissible pre-
judicial information about a defendant can be kept from a jury by
a variety of means. When such information is publicized during a
pretrial proceeding, however, it may never be altogether kept from
potential jurors. Closure of pretrial proceedings is often one of the
most effective methods that a trial judge can employ to attempt to
insure that the fairness of a trial will not be jeopardized by the
dissemination of such information throughout the community before
the trial itself has even begun."'
The opinion recognized "a strong societal interest in public trials,"' 2
but remarked that such an interest "is a far cry ... from the creation
of a constitutional right on the part of the public.""' Concluding that the
sixth amendment guarantee of a public trial was for the benefit of the
defendant," ' the Court rejected the media's claim that "members of the
general public have a constitutional right to attend a criminal trial," stating
that "the history of the public-trial guarantee ... ultimately demonstrates
no more than the existence of a common-law rule of open civil and criminal
proceedings." '
The opinion in Gannett raised more questions than it answered. While
the basic question was whether the press had a constitutional right to
attend the pretrial hearing, there was considerable discussion in the case
as to the right of the public to attend trials as opposed to pretrial
hearings."6 While the media petitioners also argued that members of the
press and the public had a right of access to pretrial hearings by reason
of the first and fourteenth amendments, the Court reserved this ques-
tion. Assuming arguendo that the media did have such a right, as the
trial judge had held, the trial judge himself had found "under the cir-
cumstances of this case, that this right was outweighed by the defen-
dants' right to a fair trial.""' 7 These difficult questions were left to be
Id. at 378-79 (citation and footnote omitted).
" Id. at 383. The opinion continued: "Openness in court proceedings may improve the
quality of testimony, induce unknown witnesses to come forward with relevant testimony,
cause all trial participants to perform their duties more conscientiously, and generally give
the public an opportunity to observe the judicial system." Id.
113 Id.
"' Id. at 380. The Court also stated:
All of this does not mean, of course, that failure to close a pretrial hearing,
or take other protective measures to minimize the impact of prejudicial public-
ity, will warrant the extreme remedy of reversal of a conviction. But it is pre-
cisely because reversal is such an extreme remedy, and is employed in only
the rarest cases, that our criminal justice system permits, and even encourages,
trial judges to be overcautious in ensuring that a defendant will receive a
fair trial.
Id. at 379 n.6.
"' Id. at 384.
.. Several times the opinion referred to the alleged sixth amendment right "to a public
trial," and the right to "attend criminal trials." See id. at 382-84, 387.
"I Id. at 393.
[Vol. 57:235
MEDIA IN THE COURTROOM
partially answered by other opinions in the case, and by Richmond
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia.'5
The Chief Justice, concurring in Gannett, argued that the holding in
the case was limited to pretrial proceedings rather than trials and that
different considerations were involved in the two."1 9 Justice Powell, also
concurring, agreed with the Chief Justice; however, he would have held
explicitly that the reporters had an interest "protected by the First and
Fourteenth Amendments in being present at the pretrial suppression
hearing.""'2 While finding such a first amendment right, he concluded that
there might be situations in which the "unrestrained exercise of First
Amendment rights poses a serious danger to the fairness of a defendant's
trial." '' Consequently, the defendant's sixth amendment trial interest
would have to be weighed against the first amendment right of the media
to report the court proceedings. Distinguishing Nebraska Press," he con-
cluded that with a proper test, the judge could order closure in spite of
the strong public interest in the case."
Like Justice Powell, Justice Rehnquist reached the first amendment
issue raised by the media. However, he rejected the "proposition ... that
the First Amendment is some sort of constitutional 'sunshine law' that
requires notice, an opportunity to be heard, and substantial reasons before
a government proceeding may be closed to the public and press."'24
The four dissenters, in an opinion written by Justice Blackmun, re-
jected the view that "if the defense and the prosecution merely agree
to have the public excluded from a suppression hearing, and the trial judge
does not resist-as trial judges may be prone not to do, since nonresistance
,, 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
.. See 443 U.S. at 394-97 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
' Id. at 397 (Powell, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
Id. at 399.
' Id. ("[Tihe gag order at issue in Nebraska Press... involved a classic prior restraint
.... In the present case ... we are confronted with a trial court's order that in effect
denies access only to one . . . source.").
in Id. at 401. (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell stated the following test:
[Ilt is the defendant's responsibility as the moving party to make some show-
ing that the fairness of his trial likely will be prejudiced by public access to
the proceedings. Similarly, if the State joins in the closure request, it should
be given the opportunity to show that public access would interfere with its
interests in fair proceedings or preserving the confidentiality of sensitive in-
formation. On the other hand, members of the press and public who object
to closure have the responsibility of showing to the court's satisfaction that
alternative procedures are available that would eliminate the dangers shown
by the defendant and the State.
Id.
1' Id. at 405 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). He relied on the Court's rulings, in a series
of cases, indicating that there was no special right of access in the press to investigate
prisons or to speak with prisoners. See Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1 (1978); Saxbe
v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
"1 Justices Brennan, White, and Marshall joined the dissent. 443 U.S. at 406.
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is easier than resistance-closure shall take place .. .. "26 They concluded
that the sixth amendment to the Constitution "prohibits the States from
excluding the public from a proceeding within the ambit of the Sixth
Amendment's guarantee without affording full and fair consideration to
the public's interests in maintaining an open proceeding."1 2' The dissenters
stressed the significance of many pretrial proceedings and the need for
the media to report them:
[T]he suppression hearing resembles and relates to the full trial in
almost every particular .... Each side has incentive to prevail, with
the result that the role of publicity as a testimonial safeguard, as a
mechanism to encourage the parties, the witnesses, and the court to
a strict conscientiousness in the performance of their duties, and in
providing a means whereby unknown witnesses may become known,
are just as important for the suppression hearing as they are for the
full trial.
Moreover, the pretrial suppression hearing often is critical, and it
may be decisive, in the prosecution of a criminal case. If the defen-
dant prevails, he will have dealt the prosecution's case a serious,
perhaps fatal, blow; the proceeding often then will be dismissed or
negotiated on terms favorable to the defense. If the prosecution suc-
cessfully resists the motion to suppress, the defendant may have lit-
tle hope of success at trial (especially where a confession is in issue),
with the result that the likelihood of a guilty plea is substantially
increased."
Justice Blackmun recognized, however, that occasions could arise in
which the needs of the media would conflict with the needs of the defen-
dant. He stated that the public might be excluded from "portions of the
proceeding at which the prejudicial information would be disclosed,"'"
but that a record of the in camera proceedings should be available to
the public "as soon as the threat to the defendant's fair-trial right has
passed.""'3 The dissenters gave a short answer to the question raised by
Id. at 406 (Blackmun, J., concurring & dissenting in part). The opinion also stated:
The sixth amendment speaks in terms of the right of the accused to a public
trial, but this right does not belong solely to the accused to assert or forego
as he or she desires.. . . The defendant's interest, primarily is to ensure fair
treatment in his or her particular case. While the public's more generalized
interest in open trials includes a concern for justice to individual defendants,
it goes beyond that. The transcendent reason for public trials is to ensure
efficiency, competence, and integrity in the overall operation of the judicial
system. Thus, the defendant's willingness to waive the right to a public trial
in a criminal case cannot be the deciding factor .... It is just as important
to the public to guard against undue favoritism or leniency as to guard against
undue harshness or discrimination.
Id. at 433 n.13 (quoting ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS,
Standard 8-3.2 at 15 (Approved Draft 1978)).
11 443 U.S. at 433 (Blackmun, J., concurring & dissenting in part). The dissenters em-
phasized that they did not reach the first amendment issue in the case. Id. at 447.
" Id. at 434.
" Id. at 445.
130 Id.
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Justice Stewart at the start of the majority opinion: There is an indepen-
dent constitutional right to insist upon access unless there is a substan-
tial probability that an open hearing would result in harm to the defen-
dant's right to a fair trial. The dissenters, however, could find no such
substantial probability in this case: "The coverage in petitioner's
newspapers . . .was circumspect. . . .All coverage ceased on August
6 and did not resume until after the suppression hearing three months
later. The stories that appeared were largely factual in nature.... And
petitioner's newspapers had only a small circulation in [the county].""'1
The conclusions to be drawn from Gannett are varied, to say the least.
One could argue effectively that the media was the big loser in the
Supreme Court. All nine Justices assumed without question that the media
had no absolute right to demand that pretrial proceedings be kept open.
Utilizing the balancing tpst of weighing the fair trial interest against the
open access interest, five members of the Court132 found that the peti-
tioner in this case could not expect an open proceeding. This conclusion
is particularly unfortunate for two reasons: first, as indicated in the dis-
senting opinion, the conduct of the media representatives was hardly
egregious."' It is not clear that alternatives would have failed or that
closure was necessary in light of the relatively calm and responsible report-
ing concerning the case. Second, the majority refused to confront the fact
that in the vast majority of criminal proceedings there is no trial, making
the reporting of important pretrial proceedings crucial. The Chief Justice
remarked that "[s]omething in the neighborhood of 85 percent of all
criminal charges are resolved by guilty pleas,"'1 a figure which has been
consistently supported by research in the area." Even in those cases which
are not resolved by guilty pleas, pretrial proceedings are often dispositive.
As Justice Powell observed in his concurring opinion, because suppres-
sion hearings may determine the outcome of the case, "the public's in-
terest in this proceeding often is comparable to its interest in the trial
itself."'38
Most distressing to some journalists was the reluctance of the Justices
,' Id. at 446-48.
'' The Chief Justice and Justices Stewart, Powell, Rehnquist, and Stevens. See id. at
378-91, 394, 397-98, 403.
133 See note 131 & accompanying text supra.
13 443 U.S. at 397 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
'1 In the county in which the trial took place, every felony prosecution for the year
1976 was terminated without a trial on the merits. Id, at 435 (Blackmun, J., concurring
& dissenting in part). The statistics cited by Justice Blackmun are particularly striking:
In the year 1976 in the Supreme Court for the City of New York, almost 90% of all criminal
cases were terminated by dismissal or by a plea of guilty. In the trial courts outside New
York City the percentage was even higher. Id. at 435 n.14. See generally NATIONAL IN-
STITUTE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE AD-
MINISTRATION, PLEA BARGAINING IN THE UNITED STATES, app. A (1978).
'1 443 U.S. at 397 n.1 (Powell, J., concurring).
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to consider seriously the first amendment claim for access to pretrial pro-
ceedings. Only Justices Powell and Rehnquist discussed the issue at length,
and only Justice Powell thought that there was some merit to the first
amendment assertion.
The result in Gannett, then, is hardly cause for media celebration. There
is, however, another side to the analysis. There is some indication that
if a proper constitutional claim had been made, five Justices might have
agreed with the media access contention in this particular case. Justice
Powell pointed out that "although I disagree with my four dissenting
Brethren concerning the origin and the scope of the constitutional limita-
tions on the closing of pretrial proceedings, I agree with their conclusion
that there are limitations and that they require the careful attention of
trial courts before closure can be ordered. ' '1 7
In spite of the serious claims of harm made in Gannett, in the vast ma-
jority of cases the pretrial publicity issue is not troublesome."M Even in
those unusual cases where the question is at issue, it appears that judges
are likely to be cautious before imposing closure orders. The American
Bar Association position is that closure should only be ordered upon
findings that "[1] the dissemination of information from the hearing would
pose a clear and present danger to the fairness of the trial, and [21 the
prejudicial effect of such information on the jurors cannot be avoided by
any reasonable alternative means.""3 9 Even the lesser standard suggested
in the proposed Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure would allow closure
only if "[1] there is a reasonable likelihood that dissemination of informa-
tion from the proceeding would interfere with defendant's right to a fair
trial by an impartial jury; and [2] the prejudicial effect of such informa-
tion on trial fairness cannot be avoided by any reasonable alternative
means."140
137 Id. at 398 n.2 (Powell, J., concurring). But see Justice Rehnquist's opinion:
I do not so lightly as my Brother Powell impdte to the four dissenters in this
case a willingness to ignore the doctrine of stare decisis and to join with him
in some later decision to form what might fairly be called an 'odd quintuplet,'
agreeing that the authority of trial courts to close judicial proceedings to the
public is subject to limitations stemming from two different sources in the
Constitution.
Id. at 405-06 n.2 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
13 But see Franklin, Untested Assumptions and Unanswered Questions, 29 STAN. L. REV.
387, 391 (1977).
119 2 ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS, supra note 94,
at Standard 8-3.6(d).
1,. Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
91 F.R.D. 289, 365-67 (1982) (proposed rule 43.1). See also Revised Report of the Judicial
Conference Committee on the Operation of the Jury System on the "Free Press-Fair Trial"
Issue, 87 F.RD. 519 (1980). The more stringent ABA Standard is the same substantive
test as used in Nebraska Press. The test was considered and rejected by the Federal Rules
Advisory Committee because "'there is a crucial difference between imposing prior restraints
against the press on the one hand and the denial of access to news sources on the other,'
and because a 'clear and present danger' test would be impractical in this setting and un-
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The situation immediately after the Court's decision in Gannett was
unsettled and unsettling."' The Court had allowed a closure order in that
pretrial proceeding, thus giving support to the defense position that
closures were generally proper."2 Gannett, though, had involved a very
specific fact situation, a closure order in a narrow pretrial proceeding.
What about closure orders in other proceedings " 3 or in the trial itself?'
The Supreme Court, just one year to the day after Gannett was decided,
shed light on this last question in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia."'
The criminal defendant in Richmond Newspapers was tried for murder
four times over a two-year period. " 6 At the fourth trial, counsel for the
defendant moved that the trial be closed to the public due to a fear that
testimony would be recounted to witnesses during the course of the pro-
ceedings. The district attorney made no objection to the motion. Pursuant
to statute,"' the judge ordered the trial closed after accepting the defense
counsel's argument and finding that "'having people in the Courtroom
is distracting to the jury.' "148 Chief Justice Burger, along with Justices
White and Stevens, began the plurality opinion by noting that the issue
in the instant case had never been decided by the Court, thereby
distinguishing Gannett."' When the question was framed by the Chief
Justice, its answer was clearly suggested:
necessary where the only consequence is deferral of public knowledge of the matters oc-
curring during closure." Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure, 91 F.R.D. 289, 372 (1982) (quoting 2 ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE, FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS, at Standard 8-3.2 note (2d ed. 1980)).
"' Within a year after the decision, over 150 proceedings were ordered closed, including
34 trials. Comment, The Public's Right to Access Versus the Right to a Fair Trial: A Balanc-
ing Compromise, 33 BAYLOR L. REV. 191, 193 n.22 (1981).
"' See generally Westchester Rockland Newspapers, Inc. v. Leggett, 48 N.Y.2d 430, 448-49,
399 N.E.2d 518, 528-29, 423 N.Y.S.2d 630, 641-42 (1979) (Fuchsberg, J., concurring).
"I For consideration of other hearings, see In re Antitrust Grand Jury Investigation,
508 F. Supp. 397 (E.D. Va. 1980) (immunity hearings), and Rapid City Journal Co. v. Circuit
Court, 283 N.W.2d 563 (SMD. 1979) (voir dire hearings). With respect to post-trial proceedings,
see United States v. Winner, 641 F.2d 825 (10th Cir. 1981). The Proposed Federal Rules
contend that "there is no justification for extending the rule to [post-trial] proceedings:'
Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
supra note 140, at 369.
"' "[Tihe Court [in Gannett] spoke no less than twelve times of a general public right
of access to criminal trials." Boyd & Lehrman, When, If Ever, Should Trials be Held Behind
Closed Doors?, 5 NOVA L.J. 1, 1 (1980).
" 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
"' In the first trial evidence was improperly obtained; the second and third trials ended
in mistrials. Id. at 559.
" In the trial of all criminal cases, whether the same be felony or misdemeanor
cases, the court may, in its discretion, exclude from the trial any persons whose
presence would impair the conduct of a fair trial, provided that the right of
the accused to a public trial shall not be violated.
VA. CODE S 19.2-266 (Supp. 1981).
448 U.S. at 561 (plurality opinion).
Id. at 563-64. "In [Gannett], the Court was not required to decide whether a right
of access to trials, as distinguished from hearings on pretrial motions, was constitutionally
guaranteed." Id. at 564 (emphasis in original).
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But here for the first time the Court is asked to decide whether a
criminal trial itself may be closed to the public upon the unopposed
request of a defendant, without any demonstration that closure is re-
quired to protect the defendant's superior right to a fair trial, or that
some other overriding consideration requires closure."
After tracing the origins of the criminal trial, the Chief Justice noted
that "[w]hat is significant for present purposes is that throughout its evolu-
tion, the trial has been open to all who cared to observe." 151 The opinion
emphasized that open access to criminal trials serves the public interest
because "the open processes of justice serve an important prophylactic
purpose, providing an outlet for community concern, hostility, and
emotion,"15 and because awareness that society is responding to crime
reduces the probability that the public will take the law into its own
hands." The difficulty here, as in Gannett, was that neither the Constitu-
tion nor the Bill of Rights contains any provision which expressly
guarantees the public or the media the right to attend criminal trials.
Nevertheless, in construing the first amendment, the Chief Justice wrote
that it could be read as "protecting the right of everyone to attend trials
so as to give meaning to those explicit guarantees. . . . The explicit,
guaranteed rights to speak and to publish concerning what takes place
at a trial would lose much meaning if access to observe the trial could,
as it was here, be foreclosed arbitrarily.""' For the three Justices, "without
the freedom to attend [criminal] trials, which people have exercised for
centuries, important aspects of freedom of speech and 'of the press could
be eviscerated.' ,15'
The Justices pointed out that the first amendment interest was not
absolute, and that the trial must remain open to the public and the press
"[a]bsent an overriding interest articulated in findings .... "157 Here,
ISO Id.; see Sack, Principle and Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 29 STAN. L. REV.
411 (1977).
448 U.S. at 564 (plurality opinion).
Id. at 571.
15 Id.
154 Id. at 575-77. The plurality noted other rights implicit in the Constitution, such as
"the rights of association and of privacy, the right to be presumed innocent, and the right
to be judged by a standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal trial ..
Id. at 579-80.
" Id. at 580. See also Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, Inc., 338 U.S. 912, 920 (1950)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) ("One of the demands of a democratic
society is that the public should know what goes on in courts by being told by.the press
what happens there, to the end that the public may judge whether our system of criminal
justice is fair and right.").
156 Just as a government may impose reasonable time, place, and manner restric-
tions upon the use of its streets in the interest of such objectives as the free
flow of traffic. . ., so may a trial judge, in the interest of the fair administra-
tion of justice, impose reasonable limitations on access to a trial.
448 U.S. at 581 n.18 (plurality opinion) (citation omitted).
"Id. at 581.
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"the trial judge made no findings to support closure; no inquiry was made
as to whether alternative solutions would have met the need to ensure
fairness; there was no recognition of any right under the Constitution
for the public or press to attend the trial.""
Justice Stevens concurred, primarily to explain the importance of the
case:1
9
This is a watershed case. Until today the Court has accorded virtually
absolute protection to the dissemination of information or ideas, but
never before has it squarely held that the acquisition of newsworthy
matter is entitled to any constitutional protection whatsoever....
Today, however, for the first time, the Court unequivocally holds that
an arbitrary interference with access to important information is an
abridgment of the freedoms of speech and of the press protected by
the First Amendment. 60
In a lengthy concurring opinion, Justices Brennan and Marshall explored
the rationale for the Court's ruling requiring open access. They
particularly stressed the unique role of the media to carry forth such
policies: "[T]he institutional press is the likely, and fitting, chief beneficiary
of a right of access because it serves as the 'agent' of interested citizens,
and funnels information about trials to a large number of individuals.".'6
Justice Stewart wrote separately to emphasize that while a first amend-
ment right existed in the press and the public with respect to access to
criminal trials, such a right had to be weighed against the interests of
the criminal defendant. In this case, he found that the trial judge had
"given no recognition" to the rights of the press and the public to be
present at trial.'62 In other cases, he would grant considerable discretion
to the trial judge. Denying that the right of access was absolute, Justice
Stewart said that "a trial judge [may] impose reasonable limitations upon
the unrestricted occupation of a courtroom by representatives of the press
and members of the public."' ' Justice Blackmun, concurring in the result,
would have relied primarily on the sixth amendment right to a public
trial.'"
Only Justice Rehnquist dissented. Analyzing the language and origins
of the first, sixth, fourteenth, and ninth amendments, he was unable to
find any provision of the Constitution which prohibited the closure of a
' Id. at 580-81.
,' Justice Stevens also explained his view, as originally set forth in Houchins v. KQED,
Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 19-40 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting), as to why access to information should
be given considerable leeway in a nontrial setting. 448 U.S. at 583-84 (Stevens, J., concurring).
16 448 U.S. at 582-83 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Id. at 586 n.2 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice White also concurred to reiterate his
view in Gannett that the sixth amendment should be construed to forbid the general clos-
ing of criminal proceedings. Id. at 581-82 (White, J., concurring).
Id at 599-601 (Stewart, J., concurring).
Id at 600 (Stewart, J., concurring).
Id. at 603 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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trial.165 He also attacked the Court's general willingness to concentrate
in itself so much power over the control of the criminal justice system.
Justice Rehnquist objected to the Court's assuming "ultimate decision-
making power over how justice shall be administered, not merely in the
federal system but in each of the 50 States."1'6 Nine persons should not
exercise such authority over 220 million people.'67
What is one to make of Richmond Newspapers with its seven separate
opinions, none commanding more than three members of the Court? While
questions concerning the legal bounds of the holding may be legitimately
raised, the case is a major victory for the media. Eight members of the
Court have explicitly recognized a first amendment right of access for
the public and the press in connection with the criminal trial.", The broad
language in the various opinions shows a judiciary most sympathetic to
media claims.169 All members of the Court who supported the first amend-
ment argument concluded that the first amendment right of the press
and public was not absolute, but had to be balanced on a case-by-case
basis against the defendant's interest in a trial free from bias. Never-
theless, in order to satisfy the Supreme Court, a judge who orders closure
of a trial will have to demonstrate, at a minimum, the existence of a
genuine potential for prejudice, the effectiveness of a closure order in
eliminating that threat, and the unavailability of alternatives in doing so."
While the media were big winners in the Supreme Court in connection
with the open access to the trial itself, it is less clear what impact, if
any, Richmond Newspapers will have beyond the trial. Most of the Justices
" Id at 605-06 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See also Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S.
at 403-06 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
1" 448 U.S. at 606 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
167 Id.
16 Justice Powell did not participate in Richmond Newspapers. Id. at 581. However, his
opinion in Gannett leaves little doubt as to his position concerning the first amendment
argument. See note 120 & accompanying text supra.
16 The various discussions call to mind the argument made by journalist Carl Stern in
response to a claim that a controversial trial should not be kept open.
I remember another case recently in suburban Washington where a judge
closed a courtroom in which three men were being tried for sex offenses against
two girls on the grounds that the men were modestly high government
employees whose work for the government would be embarrassed and their
performance for the taxpayers made more difficult if there was extensive
publicity about the case. Well, that's too bad. I can't think of a better deter-
rent to that type of conduct ....
Stern, supra note 99, at 357. For an opinion echoing the sentiments expressed in the Rich-
mond Newspapers opinions, see Westchester Rockland Newspapers, Inc. v. Leggett, 48 N.Y.2d
430, 445, 399 N.E.2d 518, 526, 423 N.Y.S.2d 630, 639 (1979) (Cooke, C.J., concurring).
170 Comment supra note 141, at 202; Comment, First Amendment-Constitutional Right
of Access to Criminal Trials, 71 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 547,557 (1980). See generally Hale,
Attitudes of Media Attorneys Concerning Criminal Proceedings, 3 CoM. & L. 3 (1981).
The Supreme Court reaffirmed its decision in Richmond Newspapers by striking down
the state statute in Globe Newspapers Co. v. Superior Court, 102 S. Ct. 2613 (1982).
Massachusetts law is unique in the country; by statute judges are required to close the
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in their separate opinions stated that this case was to be distinguished
from Gannett because Richmond Newspapers involved a trial while Gan-
nett did not."' Nevertheless, the broad language throughout the opinions
has made some commentators wonder whether Richmond Newspapers was
decided by the Court in order to "reconsider Gannett,"'' whether the Court
took the case "in order to clarify the earlier decision,"'7 3 or whether it
was intended to have "any impact at all on the Gannett decision.'7 4
However, there has already been considerable impact in the nontrial set-
ting. Some courts have gone beyond Richmond Newspapers in holding first
amendment considerations applicable to aspects of proceedings which could
courtroom to the press and the public when a sex crime victim under the age of 18 is
testifying. In other states, judges may exercise their discretion in such cases. In the trial
at issue, neither the prosecution nor the government requested closure. The Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court upheld this portion of the statute, as well as a provision giving
the judge discretion to close the entire trial:
The plaintiff says that a balancing of State interests against First Amend-
ment rights is permissible only if undertaken on a case-by-case basis. We do
not agree. We perceive no such holding in Richmond Newspapers .... [Bly
their very nature, these substantial State interests would be defeated if a
case-by-case determination were used. Ascertaining the susceptibility of an
individual victim might require expert testimony and would be a cumbersome
process at best.... To the extent that such a hearing is effective, requiring
various psychological examinations in some depth, the victim will be forced
to relive the experience.
--- Mass. at-..__, 423 N.E.2d at 779-80. The media argument on appeal was that "no por-
tion of the trial should be closed without a hearing at which the judge must ascertain
that the reasons for the closing are 'tangible and substantial' and that the young victim's
interest cannot otherwise be adequately protected." Greenhouse, Law Closing Testimony
in Sex Case Faces Test, N.Y. Times, Nov. 17, 1981, S A, at 11, col. 1.
While there is considerable force behind the statutory policy, and while a closure order
will be proper in many such cases, the Court in a 6-3 decision (the Chief Justice and Justices
Rehnquist and Stevens dissenting) found that the statute conflicted irreconcilably with
the holding in Richmond Newspapers. 102 S. Ct. at 2622-23, 2627. The Court in Richmond
Newspapers stressed the first amendment interests in keeping important criminal trials
open. It required "an overriding interest articulated in findings" before closure would be
proper. A blanket closure rule in all cases in which minor victims testify conflicts with
this principle. Id. at 2620-22. As stated by Justice Brennan for the Globe Newspapers ma-
jority, "[The state's interest] could be served just as well by requiring the trial court to
determine on a case-by-case basis whether the State's legitimate concern for the well-being
of the minor victim necessitates closure." Id. at 2621.
'" See, e.g., 448 U.S. at 563-64 (plurality opinion). Justice Stevens found that "[tihe absence
of any articulated reason for the closure order" distinguished Richmond Newspapers from
Gannett. Id. at 584 n.2 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Boyd & Lehrman, supra note 144, at 2.
' Comment, supra note 141, at 194.
' The Supreme Court, 1979 Term, 94 HARV. L. REv. 77,156 n.42 (1980). The commentator
stated:
It is much less certain whether Richmond Newspapers extends a first amend-
ment right of access to the pretrial context. In Gannett, the Court rejected
the analogical argument that the sixth amendment policies justifying open
trials should justify access to pretrial proceedings; the impact of Richmond




be termed nontrial.' 5 The tone of the opinions in Richmond Newspapers
has influenced trial judges who apply a much closer scrutiny to closure
requests than ever before.' 6
The Richmond Newspapers case, for all its uncertainty, for all the ques-
tions concerning its potential impact, can properly be labeled as the
Supreme Court's "most ringing endorsement of the press and public's
right of access to government under the First Amendment."'. Indeed,
as counsel for the newspapers stated, "'[t]he fact is the Court has taken
as large a leap in the First Amendment area as it has in the last quarter
century."" 8 This leap was significant and entirely justified, for the closure
1,5 Consider, for example, the attempt by one district judge to close portions of voir
dire examination of jurors and to examine veniremen individually in chambers. The court
of appeals frowned upon this type of closed activity in In re United States ex rel. Pulitzer
Publishing Co., 635 F.2d 676, 678 (8th Cir. 1980). The court explained:
Our sole reason for granting the writ in this case is based on the failure
of the district judge to announce his reasons for the decision to close the voir
dire proceedings and for his failure to balance the right of the public to at-
tend the trial against the right of the defendant to a fair trial in accordance
with the principles announced in [Richmond Newspapers].
Id. See also a decision to label a juvenile delinquency proceeding a "criminal trial" under
Richmond Newspapers, holding that the press had a first amendment right to attend such
sessions absent unusual circumstances. In re certain Juvenile Delinquency Proceedings,
[19811 29 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 2248.
.7. In Palm Beach Newspapers, Inc. v. Florida, 378 So. 2d 862, 864-65 (Dist. Ct. App. 1980),
rev'd, 395 So. 2d 544, 548 (Fla. 1981), the court found that two witnesses' fear of retaliation
for testifying was insufficient cause to exclude the press without specific supporting infor-
mation. But see Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, -- Mass._ , 423 N.E.2d 773
(1981) (statute requiring closure during testimony of minor complainants in sexual assault
cases constitutional). As indicated previously, see note 170 supra, the United States Supreme
Court reversed in Globe Newspaper.
" Comment, supra note 101. This is especially clear when Richmond Newspapers is con-
trasted with the prison access cases, see note 124 supra.
178 Comment, supra note 177, at 947. Harvard Law Professor Lawrence Tribe argued
the case. Id. Professor Tribe's enthusiasm ought not to be unrestrained, however. Under
the Supreme Court's ruling, trials still may be closed in special cases, see Sacramento Bee
v. United States Dist. Court, 656 F.2d 477 (9th Cir. 1981); and, of course, the case does
not overrule Gannett, thus allowing closures quite readily in pretrial matters, see Federated
Publications, Inc. v. Swedberg, 96 Wash. 2d 13, 633 P.2d 74 (1981) (reporters could be ex-
cluded from suppression hearings in "Hillside Strangler" case if they refused to sign agree-
ment to abide by state's barlbench/press guidelines). As indicated in note 175 & accompany-
ing text supra, however, it cannot be doubted that Richmond Newspapers has had con-
siderable impact, even on the pretrial situation ostensibly covered by Gannett. This point
was well made in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Chappell, 403 So. 2d 1342, 1344 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1981), where the court refused to close a pretrial competency hearing. On appeal
the judges adopted a three-part test to review closure orders:
[The public may be denied access ... only if the movant proves that: (1)
closure is necessary to prevent a serious and imminent threat to the administra-
tion of justice, (2) no less restrictive alternative measure is available, and (3)
closure will in fact achieve the court's purpose .... The first prong of the
test protects a defendant's right to a fair trial; the second prong employs tradi-
tional First Amendment techniques, and the third prong employs practical
considerations. Because the test protects competing societal interests in pro-
viding fair trials while permitting free access to courts, we adopt its criteria.
Id. at 1345 (citations omitted).
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order poses a great threat to the free dissemination of information about
unquestionably newsworthy events. In that sense, it parallels the prior
restraint conflict in Nebraska Press. In both cases the press would not
be allowed to report newsworthy events, in the former case, by a court
order of prohibition, and in the latter case, by a court order cutting off
the source of information. The only real question to be raised as a matter
of policy in Richmond Newspapers is why the Court did not take the op-
portunity to overrule or at least seriously cut back the shortsighted
holding in Gannett.
B. The Privacy and Rehabilitation Interests
To this point this article has examined cases in which the reporting
of criminal trials has arguably conflicted with only one interest, that of
the defendant under the sixth amendment to receive a fair trial before
an unbiased jury. Apart from the trial and pretrial publicity conflicts,
other interests may surface when there is media coverage of a criminal
trial. Of great concern in this area are questions involving the privacy
and rehabilitation of offenders.'79 One of the most famous cases in the
area, Melvin v. Reid," illustrates these interests. The plaintiff was a
former prostitute who had been tried for murder. The murder trial was
widely reported, but she was acquitted. After the trial, she married and
became, according to the court, "entirely rehabilitated."'' Seven years
after the trial, the movie "The Red Kimono" was made; in the film the
plaintiff's former life was set out in some detail. Included in the film were
the facts of the murder charge and trial as well as the plaintiff's name.'82
The California court recognized the press and public interest generally
in access to such information:
[The use of the incidents from the life of appellant in the moving
picture is in itself not actionable. These incidents appeared in the
records of her trial for murder, which is a public record, open to the
perusal of all. The very fact that they were contained in a public record
is sufficient to negative the idea that their publication was a violation
of a right of privacy. When the incidents of a life are so public as
to be spread upon a public record, they come within the knowledge
and into the possession of the public and cease to be private."
The public interest, however, did not include the need to know the plain-
tiffs name because it was not newsworthy. In addition, the use of the
' The problem of televising criminal proceedings raises all three issues: privacy con-
cerns, questions of rehabilitation, and issues surrounding the unbiased jury. See notes 243-96
& accompanying text infra.
,S 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 P. 91 (1931).
,II d. at 286, 297 P. at 91.
18 Id. at 287, 297 P. at 91.
18 Id. at 290, 297 P. at 93.
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name tended to jeopardize society's efforts to rehabilitate convicted
criminals: 8 '
One of the major objectives of society as it is now constituted, and
of the administration of our penal system, is the rehabilitation of the
fallen and the reformation of the criminal. Under these theories of
sociology, it is our object to lift up and sustain the unfortunate rather
than tear him down. Where a person has by his own efforts
rehabilitated himself, we, as right-thinking members of society, should
permit him to continue in the path of rectitude rather than throw
him back into a life of shame or crime. Even the thief on the cross
was permitted to repent during the hours of his final agony.1"
The court allowed a civil action by the plaintiff against the producers.'
The "Red Kimono" case was relied on in Briscoe v. Reader's Digest
Association,"17 a thoughtful opinion written by the California Supreme
Court forty years later. The plaintiff had been convicted in 1956 of truck
hijacking. Immediately thereafter he became rehabilitated. The defendant
published an article discussing truck hijacking. The article referred to
the plaintiff and the conviction, but not to the fact that the hijacking had
occurred eleven years earlier. The court found that as a "result of the
defendant's publication, plaintiff's 11-year-old daughter, as well as his
friends, for the first time learned of this incident. They thereafter scorned
and abandoned him."1"
The facts in Briscoe put the question at issue. In a situation in which
the basic story was newsworthy," 9 how would the interest in the
dissemination of information balance against the objective of rehabilitating
felons and the interest in the felon's privacy after he had been
rehabilitated? The court acknowledged the important interest in repor-
ting crimes and judicial proceedings and even in identifying persons cur-
rently charged with crimes."' The reports of past crimes and the iden-
tification of past defendants were different matters.
[I]dentification of the actor in reports of long past crimes usually serves
little independent public purpose. Once legal proceedings have ter-
minated, and a suspect or offender has been released, identification
See id. at 290-91, 297 P. at 93.
" Id. at 292, 297 P. at 93.
Though at the time it was not clear that there was a cause of action denominated
privacy, the court was willing to allow the claim to go forward no matter what the label
given to it. Id. at 292, 291 P. at 93-94.
4 Cal. 3d 529, 483 P.2d 34, 93 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1971).
Id. at 533, 483 P.2d at 36, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 868.
"' There was little question raised by the court that this was a legitimate newsworthy
story involving substantial public issues. The plaintiff himself conceded that the basic sub-ject of the article "may have been 'newsworthy.'" Id
190 There can be no doubt that reports of current criminal activities are the
legitimate province of a free press. The circumstances under which crimes
occur, the techniques used by those outside the law, the tragedy that may
befall the victims-these are vital bits of information for people coping with
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of the individual will not usually aid the administration of justice. Iden-
tification will no longer serve to bring forth witnesses or obtain suc-
cor for victims. Unless the individual has reattracted the public eye
to himself in some independent fashion, the only public "interest" that
would usually be served is that of curiosity.191
The court went on to state that "the state has a compelling interest in
the efficacy of penal systems in rehabilitating criminals .... A jury might
well find that a continuing threat that the rehabilitated offender's old
identity will be resurrected by the media is counter-productive to the
goals of this correctional process."'192
A wide-ranging balancing test was adopted in Briscoe to determine
whether the plaintiff's privacy action would lie. He would have to show
that the publication was not newsworthy and that it revealed facts so
offensive as to shock the community's notions of decency.19 The case was
remanded to the trial court to decide
(1) whether plaintiff had become a rehabilitated member of society,
(2) whether identifying him as a former criminal would be highly of-
fensive and injurious to the reasonable man, (3) whether defendant
published this information with a reckless disregard for its offen-
siveness, and (4) whether any independent justification for printing
plaintiff's identity existed."'
Melvin and Briscoe, taken together, represent an important line of cases
because they demonstrate an awareness by the judiciary of the balance
involved in the privacy and rehabilitation cases. On the one hand, many
the exigencies of modern life. Reports of these events may also promote the
values served by the constitutional guarantee of a public trial. Although a
case is not to be "tried in the papers," reports regarding a crime or criminal
proceedings may encourage unknown witnesses to come forward with useful
testimony and friends or relatives to come to the aid of the victim.
It is also generally in the social interest to identify adults currently charged
with the commission of a crime. While such an identification may not presume
guilt, it may legitimately put others on notice that the named individual is
suspected of having committed a crime. Naming the suspect may also per-
suade eye witnesses and character witnesses to testify. For these reasons,
while the suspect or offender obviously does not consent to public exposure,
his right to privacy must give way to the overriding social interest.
Id. at 536, 483 P.2d at 39, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 871 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 537, 483 P.2d at 40, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 872 (emphasis in original).
19 Id. at 542, 483 P.2d at 43, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 875.
" Id. at 541, 483 P.2d at 42-43, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 874-75.
"' Id. at 543, 483 P.2d at 44, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 876. Commentators generally applauded
Briscoe. See Comment, First Amendment Limitations on Public Disclosure Actions, 45 U.
CH. L. REv. 180,199 (1977); Comment, An Accommodation ofPrivacy Interests andFirst Amend-
ment Rights in Public Disclosure Cases, 124 U. PA. L. REv. 1385, 1392, 1399 (1976). But see
Forsher v. Bugliosi, 26 Cal. 3d 792, 608 P.2d 716, 163 Cal. Rptr. 628 (1980), where the California
Supreme Court noted that the courts in California have refrained from extending the Briscoe
rule to other cases: "Our decision in Briscoe was an exception to the more general rule
that 'once a man has become a public figure, or news, he remains a matter of legitimate
recall to the public mind to the end of his days.'" Id. at 811, 608 P.2d at 726, 163 Cal.
Rptr. at 638 (quoting Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REv. 383, 418 (1960)).
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of these cases, particularly cases dealing with reporting of recent events,
involve especially newsworthy activities and should be given considerable
deference under the first amendment. 15 On the other hand, questions must
be raised as to whether such deference should be given when the event
is not current or identification of an individual adds little to the newswor-
thiness of the story but could adversely affect important privacy and
rehabilitation interests.' The California courts seem to have struck the
correct balance in dealing with these important concerns. These cases
contrast with several cases recently decided by the Supreme Court in
which the Court spent little time analyzing the rehabilitation and privacy
interests and instead focused almost exclusively on first amendment
objectives.
In Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn,97 the privacy interest was para-
mount. The plaintiffs teenaged daughter was the victim of a rape who
died during the incident. Six teenagers were indicted for both the murder
and the rape. There was substantial media coverage of the incident and
the trial, but the identity of the victim was not disclosed prior to trial.
At the time the trial court accepted the guilty pleas, the defendant broad-
casting company named the victim in a news report describing the court
proceedings. Claiming an invasion of privacy, the father of the victim sued
the defendants for money damages. 98 During the course of the civil pro-
ceedings, all parties conceded that the defendants had learned the name
of the victim from an examination of the indictments which were available
for inspection by the public in the courtroom. " The state trial court found
that the defendant's broadcasting was in violation of a state statute which
made it a misdemeanor to publish or broadcast the name or identity of
a rape vicitim. 00
The Georgia Supreme Court rejected the defendant's claim that the
first amendment, as a matter of constitutional law, required judgment
for the defendant. The court agreed that the criminal proceedings were
matters of public concern. The court disagreed with the broader media
argument, concluding instead that there was "no public interest or general
concern about the identity of the victim of such a crime as will make
195 4 Cal. 3d at 537, 483 P.2d at 39, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 871.
It is quite difficult to articulate the strong first amendment interest involved in
publishing the plaintiffs name in Briscoe, rather than merely describing the events.
"9 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
"' Id. at 471-75. Considerable question was raised as to whether, apart from constitu-
tional claims, there existed a right of privacy in the plaintiff for disclosure of the name
of the deceased daughter. The trial judge held that the Georgia statute gave a civil remedy
to the plaintiff. The Georgia Supreme Court held that the trial court's ruling was in error
but found that the common law tort of public disclosure allowed for an invasion of privacy
claim. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 231 Ga. 60, 61-62, 200 S.E.2d 127, 129-30 (1973),
rev'd, 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
' 420 U.S. 469, 472-73 (1975).
Id. at 471 n.1 (citing GA. CODE ANN. S 26-9901 (1972)).
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the right to disclose the identity of the victim rise to the level of First
Amendment protection.'201
Looking to the injury involved in the case, public disclosure of private
facts, the United States Supreme Court chose to construe the issue nar-
rowly: "whether the State may impose sanctions on the accurate publica-
tion of the name of a rape victim obtained from public records-more
specifically, from judicial records which are maintained in connection with
a public prosecution and which themselves are open to public inspection." 2
The Court relied heavily on the media defendant's role in reporting the
criminal trial proceedings. The Court reasoned that individuals have
limited opportunities to see the government at work and that the media's
reporting of governmental proceedings is a service without which many
citizens and their representatives "would be unable to vote intelligently
or to register opinions on the administration of government generally.
With respect to judicial proceedings in particular, the function of the press
serves to guarantee the fairness of trials .... ,,20" Justice White, writing
for the majority, rejected plaintiff's claim "that the efforts of the press
have infringed his right to privacy by broadcasting to the world the fact
that his daughter was a rape victim.""2 4 He explained: "The commission
of crime, prosecutions resulting from it, and judicial proceedings arising
from the prosecutions ... are without question events of legitimate con-
cern to the public and consequently fall within the responsibility of the
press to report theoperations of government.""0 In reversing the Georgia
courts, the Court placed considerable emphasis on the fact that the infor-
mation in this case had been placed in the public domain as official court
records.2"8 The Court gave virtually no consideration to the privacy in-
terests claimed by the family of the rape and murder victim: "Once true
information is disclosed in public court documents open to public inspec-
11 Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 231 Ga. 60, 68, 200 S.E.2d 127, 134 (1973), rev'd, 420
U.S. 469 (1975). The court relied heavily on the Briscoe case. Interestingly enough, in Briscoe
the California Supreme Court said that the disclosure of the names of suspects in connec-
tion with recent crimes would generally be protected by the first amendment. 4 Cal. 3d
at 537, 483 P.2d at 39, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 871. However, the court pointed out that the media
would not necessarily have an "unmitigated right" to publish the identity of offenders or
victims, relying on numerous statutes which prohibited the disclosure of the name of the
rape victims in news reports, including the Georgia statute at issue in the Cox Broadcasting
case. Id. at 537 n.10, 483 P.2d at 39 n.10, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 871 n.10.
420 U.S. at 491.
2 Id. at 492.
2 Id.
205 Id.
Id. at 495. The Court was almost unanimous in its holding. Chief Justice Burger con-
curred in the judgment and Justices Powell and Douglas wrote concurring opinions focus-
ing more generally on the first amendment issues with respect to public figures and public
affairs. Only Justice Rehnquist dissented; his dissent was limited to the question of whether
the decision which was the subject of the appeal was a final judgment or decree under
28 U.S.C. S 1257 (Supp. IV 1974). Id. at 501.
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tion, the press cannot be sanctioned for publishing it. In this instance
as in others reliance must rest upon the judgment of those who decide
what to publish or broadcast.""7
The Supreme Court chose not to deal with the issues raised in Briscoe
as well as in the Georgia courts' disposition in Cox Broadcasting. Although
in many instances society needs to rely upon the judgment of those who
decide what to publish or broadcast, it is not clear that the rape victim's
disclosure case is such an instance. As the court in Briscoe pointed out,
there is necessarily a delicate balance between the interests of free
dissemination of information on the one side and preservation of privacy
and rehabilitation interests on the other. Even more to the point is the
conclusion reached by the Georgia Supreme Court in Cox Broadcasting:
There is "no public interest or general concern about the identity of the
victim of such a crime as will make the right to disclose the identity of
the victim rise to the level of First Amendment protection."" No doubt
the incident is newsworthy and the trial is newsworthy, but what is the
public interest in the identity of the victim or the victim's family? Unfor-
tunately, the Court did little to respond to this question."9 The Justices
simply concluded that publication of truthful information contained in of-
ficial court records open to public inspection cannot be the subject of
criminal sanction under the first and fourteenth amendments. 10
27 Id. at 496.
08 231 Ga. 60, 68, 200 S.E.2d 127, 134 (1973), rev'd, 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
A number of the cases following Cox Broadcasting also chose to ignore the question.
In McCormack v. Oklahoma Publishing Co., 613 P.2d 737 (Okla. 1980), the court, acknowledg-
ing the holding in Melvin v. Reid, rejected it: "'There is no liability for giving publicity
to facts about the plaintiff's life which [sic] are matters of public record.'" Id. at 742 (quoting
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS S 652 D, Comment b (1977)). See also Moloney v. Tribune
Publishing Co., 26 Wash. App. 357, 363, 613 P.2d 1179, 1183 (1980) ("If the report of an
official public action or proceeding is accurate or a fair abridgement, an action cannot con-
stitutionally be maintained, either for defamation or for invasion of the right to privacy.").
As broadly stated in WXYZ, Inc. v. Hand, 658 F.2d 420, 427 (6th Cir. 1981): "[The statute]
represents a legislative determination that in every case involving certain sex offenses,
there exists a sufficiently serious and imminent threat to the privacy interests of the per-
sons involved to justify a suppression order. Deference to such legislative judgments is impos-
sible when First Amendment rights are at stake."
210 The holding was strongly criticized:
Buttressing the result dictated by its first two grounds of decision, the Court
argued that, as recognized by the common law public records defense to a
privacy action, there is no substantial privacy interest in information already
on the public record. Although the Court was less than explicit, the argu-
ment seems to be that because no legitimate privacy interests are infringed
by giving publicity to public information, it is unconstitutional to impose sanc-
tions on the press for printing such information regardless of its importance.
This argument rests on a false premise. Although it is true that a public
disclosure action lies only if the facts disclosed are not widely known, it is
disingenuous to suggest that all facts on the public record are public facts,
in the sense that they are known to a substantial number of people. Giving
publicity to little-known facts in the public record may appreciably affect in-
dividual privacy.
Comment, First Amendment Limitations on Public Disclosure Actions, supra note 194, at
189-90 (footnotes omitted).
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By emphasizing the public nature of the trial and the public access to
the court records in Cox Broadcasting, the Court left important questions
open. The question was soon raised as to the result in cases in which
there were state policies not allowing access by either the public or the
press to various kinds of official records. Soon, too, the Court was con-
fronted with cases involving proceedings which had traditionally been
closed to the public, such as juvenile delinquency matters. Moreover, jour-
nalists asked what the impact of Cox Broadcasting would be when facts
were found due to the independent investigation of the journalists rather
than the availability of public records. The Court quickly answered these
questions in a way which did little to displease the media defendants.
In Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District Court,"' the Supreme Court, in
a short per curiam opinion, relied heavily upon the decisions in Cox
Publishing and Nebraska Press. The state trial judge had enjoined
members of the news media from "'publishing, broadcasting, or
disseminating, in any manner, the name or picture of [a] minor child' in
connection with a juvenile proceeding involving that child then pending
... ,"212 The reporters for the defendant's newspapers had been in the
courtroom during an open hearing on a detention petition in connection
with a murder case. The newspaper obtained the eleven-year-old delin-
quent's name and-picture. Thereafter, the trial judge entered the order,
and the media petitioners moved to quash."' The Court held that under
the first amendment the state judge could not "prohibit the publication
of widely disseminated information obtained at court proceedings which
were in fact open to the public."21 4
The Oklahoma case was an easy one. While the state statute provided
for closed juvenile hearings, members of the press were present at the
hearing with the full knowledge of the judge, the prosecutor, and the
juvenile's lawyer. The media representatives had thus obtained the in-
formation lawfully and with the state's implicit approval."5 Consequently,
the Court quickly found that Cox Broadcasting required the result, without
having to focus on the purposes which could be served by closed pro-
ceedings. Just one year later, however, the Court had before it a case
in which the proceedings could be closed under state statute and were
closed during the reporting of the incident.
The Virginia State Constitution2 1 6 and statutes1 ' prohibited the
211 430 U.S. 308 (1977) (per curiam).
112 Id. at 308 (quoting pretrial order entered by Dist. Court, Okla. County).
213 Id. at 309.
A" Id. at 310.
,,I Id. at 311.
216 VA. CONST. art. VI, S 10, quoted in Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S.
829, 830 n.1 (1978).
217 VA. CODE S 2.1-37.13 (1973), quoted in Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435
U.S. 829, 830 n.1 (1978); see Judicial Inquiry & Rev. Comm'n R. 10, quoted in 435 U.S. at 830 n.1.
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dissemination of information respecting the investigations of the confiden-
tial judicial review commission. The media defendant in Landmark Com-
munications, Inc. v. Virginia.. was found guilty of violating these provi-
sions by publishing an article which accurately reported on a pending
inquiry by the commission, and which identified the state judge whose
conduct was the subject of the investigation.2 19 The Supreme Court
acknowledged that a large number of states had statutes requiring con-
fidentiality with respect to judicial inquiry commissions." It listed three
functions served by the requirement of confidentiality in commission pro-
ceedings: first, protection against harm to a judge's reputation which might
unfairly result from frivolous complaints; second, maintenance of con-
fidence in the judicial system in preventing early disclosure of an other-
wise unfounded charge; and third, protection of complainants and
witnesses from possible recrimination."' The Court decided that the first
amendment interest involved outweighed these functions after determin-
ing "that the publication Virginia seeks to punish under its statute lies
near the core of the First Amendment . . . ."' Chief Justice Burger
stressed that the state courts had not demonstrated in the case at hand
that the facts were such as to justify criminal sanction:
It is true that some risk of injury to the judge under inquiry, to the
system of justice, or to the operation of the Judicial Inquiry and Review
Commission may be posed by premature disclosure, but the test re-
quires that the danger be "clear and present" and in our view the
risk here falls far short of that requirement.m
The interest in confidentiality may be significant and the dissemination
of information during the pendency of the proceedings may jeopardize
that interest, yet the Court concluded without question that the first
amendment interest must prevail.
Once again, the Court's decision in a case involving a balance of the
first amendment against other interests is not difficult to understand.
The state had not made an effective case for demonstrating the need for
criminal prosecution.' Still, the result is troublesome. While in Cox Broad-
218 435 U.S. 829 (1978).
219 Id. at 831-32.
Id. at 834.
" Id. at 833.
Id. at 838.
Id. at 845. The Court relied on the fact that in more than 40 states having similar
commissions, criminal sanctions were not used to enforce the confidentiality against non-
participants. Id. at 841.
"' The Court did discuss alternatives which could be used, such as contempt proceedings
against the breach of the confidentiality requirement by commission members or staff,
the ability to require witnesses and members to take an oath of secrecy, and so forth.
Id. at 841 n.12. It is not clear to this writer why such alternatives are so obviously superior
to the approach taken by Virginia. In each of these alternative cases, the ultimate sanction
(for violating the oath, for being held in contempt) would be a criminal or quasi-criminal
penalty. But see Justice Stewart's concurring opinion, where he argued that confidentiality
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casting the Court had before it a specific case involving fairly compelling
facts, it refused to look to the facts in support of a privacy claim and
focused exclusively on the first amendment issue. In Landmark Com-
munications no specific facts were presented by the defendant, yet broad
policies were enunciated in support of the result. Still, the Court had lit-
tle trouble rejecting the privacy claim.
Some of the questions which remained open after Cox Broadcasting and
Landmark Communications were considered in Smith v. Daily Mail
Publishing Co."' The proceedings were directed to be closed by the state
statute and were actually closed. 6 A strong argument was made as to
a countervailing interest which would be served by the confidentiality
of the proceedings.
The West Virginia Code provided: "[Nor shall the name of any child,
in connection with any proceedings under this chapter, be published in
any newspaper without a written order of the court"; and "[a] person who
violates . . .a provision of this chapter for which punishment has not
been specifically provided, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor .... M" In
1978 a junior high school student was shot and killed at school by a
fourteen-year-old classmate. The classmate was identified by numerous
eyewitnesses and was arrested by police soon after the incident. The media
defendant learned of the shooting by monitoring the police band radio.
Reporters and photographers were dispatched to the school. They ob-
tained the name of the assailant by asking various witnesses. The follow-
ing day the newspaper published a story about the shooting including
the juvenile's name and picture.'
"The predominant philosophy of the juvenile justice system in the twen-
tieth century has been one of positivism and rehabilitation. Protecting
confidentiality in the juvenile process has been a central but controver-
sial tenet of this philosophy."m In Daily Mail the state effectively argued
the need for confidentiality by linking it to this goal of rehabilitating
was a high government interest. He decided, however, that the state could not punish
the newspaper:
If the constitutional protection of a free press means anything, it means that
government cannot take it upon itself to decide what a newspaper may and
may not publish. Though government may deny access to information and
punish its theft, government may not prohibit or punish the publication of
that information once it falls into the hands of the press, unless the need for
secrecy is manifestly overwhelming.
Id. at 849 (Stewart, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
= 443 U.S. 97 (1979).
Id. at 98-100.
W. VA CODE S 49-7-3 to -7-20 (1976).
443 U.S. at 99-100.
Comment, Freedom of the Press vs. Juvenile Anonymity: A Conflict Between Constitu-
tional Priorities and Rehabilitation, 65 IowA L. REv. 1471, 1471 (1980) (footnotes omitted).
' Brief of Petitioners at 9-17, Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979).
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juvenile delinquents, ° "the primary goal of the juvenile justice system."' '
Justice Rehnquist, in his concurring opinion, stressed that "publicity may
have a harmful impact on the rehabilitation of a juvenile offender." 2 In
support of his proposition, Justice Rehnquist referred to an empirical
psychological study on the effects of publicity on a juvenile.2 For Justice
Rehnquist, a prohibition against publication of the names of youthful of-
fenders was a small price to pay to promote the state policy. "[A] State's
interest in preserving the anonymity of its juvenile offenders -an interest
that I consider to be, in the words of the Court, of the 'highest order'-
far outweighs any minimal interference with freedom of the press that
a ban on publication of the youths' names entails." 4
The remainder of the Court 5 disagreed with Justice Rehnquist. For
the majority, the focal point was "simply the power of a state to punish
the truthful publication of an alleged juvenile delinquent's name lawfully
obtained by a newspaper."" The Court noted that the only interest ad-
vanced to justify the statute was the protection of the anonymity of the
juvenile offender. "It is asserted that confidentiality will further his
1 Comment, supra note 229, at 1483. As noted in S.A.S. v. Dis. Court, -Colo. ,
623 P.2d 58, 60 (1981) (citation omitted):
In order to protect the young from the stigma frequently associated with
criminal proceedings, a petition in delinquency is classified as civil in character.
The state's role in such a proceeding is not that of a prosecutor in a criminal
case, but rather the role of parens patriae to protect the welfare of the child.
443 U.S. at 108 n.1 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
Recently, two clinical psychologists conducted an investigation into the effects
of publicity on a juvenile. They concluded that publicity 'placed additional stress
on [the juvenile] during a difficult period of adjustment in the community,
and it interfered with his adjustment at various points when he was other-
wise proceeding adequately.' Publication of the youth's name and picture also
led to confrontations between the juvenile and his peers while he was in deten-
tion. While this study obviously is not controlling, it does indicate that the
concerns that prompted enactment of state laws prohibiting publication of the
names of juvenile offenders are not without empirical support.
Id. (quoting Howard, Grisso & Neems, Publicity and Juvenile Court Proceedings, 11 CLEAR-
INGHOUSE REV. 203, 210 (1977)). The subject of this study was the eleven-year-old boy accused
of the shooting in Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District Court, 430 U.S. 308 (1977). Id.
443 U.S. at 107. Justice Rehnquist concurred because the statute did not accomplish
its stated purpose. Only newspapers were prohibited from printing the names of the youths,
with the statute excluding electronic media and other forms of publication. Id. at 110. The
majority of the Court agreed. Id. at 104-05. It disagreed, however, with his conclusion that
"a generally effective ban on publication that applied to all forms of mass communication,
electronic and print media alike, would be constitutional," id. at 110 (Rehnquist, J., concur-
ring); see id. at 102-03 (majority opinion).
' Justice Powell did not participate in the decision. 443 U.S. at 106.
m' Id. at 105-06. The Court relied heavily on Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974), where
the state had not permitted a criminal defendant to impeach a prosecution witness on the
basis of his juvenile record. The Court had struck down the state's ruling, finding that
the state's policy had to be subordinated to the defendant's sixth amendment right of con-
frontation. But see Justice Rehnquist's response to this point:
In Davis, where the defendant's liberty was at stake, the Court stated that
'[slerious damage to the strength of the State's case would have been a real
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rehabilitation because publication of the name may encourage further an-
tisocial conduct and also may cause the juvenile to lose future employ-
ment or suffer other consequences for this single offense."'u The majority
opinion of the Chief Justice did not substantively analyze this claim, but
merely stated that "[t]he magnitude of the State's interest in this statute
is not sufficient to justify application of a criminal penalty to
respondents."' Because forty-five other states had similar confidentiality
statutes without criminal penalties, the State of West Virginia had not
demonstrated that its action was "necessary to further the state interests
asserted.'""O
The Daily Mail case represents a resounding triumph for the media.
The state presented a very strong case: This was a proceeding which
had traditionally been found to be confidential, empirical evidence was
offered in support of the need for confidentiality, and the media's infor-
mation was received outside of the closed official proceedings. Indeed,
the Court chose not to dispute Justice Rehnquist's point that "[p]ublica-
tion of the names of juvenile offenders may seriously impair the
rehabilitative goals of the juvenile justice system and handicap the youths'
prospects for adjustment in society and acceptance by the public.""24 Even
granting such an interference, the Court found that the first amendment
interest in the dissemination of information concerning the proceedings
prevailed. 4' One can seriously challenge this conclusion. No doubt the
reporting of the basic incident and the proceedings was newsworthy and
deserved protection under the first amendment. It is not clear, however,
what the interest of the public is in finding out the name of the delin-
quent. Nor is it clear what the adverse impact of a contrary Court ruling
would be on the media and the public. Was not Justice Rehnquist's point
well taken? Is this not a trivial interference with the media's function
of keeping the public well informed about newsworthy events? The Court
possibility had petitioner been allowed to pursue this line of inquiry [related
to the juvenile offender's record].' The State also could have protected the
youth from exposure by not using him to make out its case. By contrast, in
this case the State took every step that was in its power to protect the juvenile's
name, and the minimal interference with the freedom of the press caused by
the ban on publication of the youth's name can hardly be compared with the
possible deprivation of liberty involved in Davis. Because in each case we must
carefully balance the interest of the State in pursuing its policy against the
magnitude of the encroachment on the liberty of speech and of the press that
the policy represents, it will not do simply to say, as the Court does, that
the 'important rights created by the First Amendment must be considered
along with the rights of defendants guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.'
443 U.S. at 109 n.2 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
, Id. at 104.
2Id.
Id. at 102, 105.
240 Id. at 107-08 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
21 See note 238 & accompanying text supra.
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refused to address these questions, deferring as before to the first amend-
ment contentions, which lacked considerable strength in this particular
case.242 As in Cox Broadcasting and Landmark Communications, one must
question the Court's lack of consideration of interests other than the first
amendment.
C. Televising Trials
The televising of trials is an area quite apart from the previous discus-
sions. The media are not closed out of proceedings. They are not forbid-
den to disseminate information and are not restricted as to the content
of the information they publish. There is no punishment, civil or criminal,
for the act of publishing. The question here is whether the electronic media
shall have access to the criminal trial so that the trial process may be
photographed or televised.
Throughout recent history, lawyers have been both skeptical about the
media need for photographic coverage of criminal trials (whether still
cameras or television) and apprehensive about the potential for disrup-
tion. Nowhere was this fear realized more clearly than in the spectacular
trial of Bruno Hauptmann for the Lindbergh kidnapping.4 The American
242 The majority could have decided the case on the equal protection ground that only
newspapers were covered under the statute. See note 234 & accompanying text supra.
Instead, this point became somewhat of an afterthought. See 443 U.S. at 104-05.
23 State v. Hauptmann, 115 N.J.L. 412, 180 A. 809 (1935), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 649 (1935).
The scene was well described in Seidman, supra note 7, at 13-14 (footnotes omitted):
Guilty or innocent, Bruno Richard Hauptmann certainly did not receive a
trial calculated to determine the truth in a reliable fashion. The jury's verdict
served only to formalize a verdict reached months earlier by the press. From
the moment the Lindbergh child was seized, press coverage was intense and
unremitting. Although the hysteria abated somewhat during the long search
for the kidnapper, it began anew upon Hauptmann's arrest. Reams of copy
were published examining every scrap of evidence tending to implicate Haupt-
mann. By the time of the trial, most major papers had established small bureaus
in Flemington and had conducted massive advertising campaigns boasting of
their coverage.
Flemington, a peaceful town of 2500 with a one-man police force, was simply
not prepared to deal with the 64,000 sightseers and 16,000 automobiles that
descended on it. Predictably, complete bedlam reigned outside the courthouse.
The situation was only slightly less chaotic in the courtroom itself. The media
and the spectators constantly disrupted court proceedings. Elaborate telegraph
equipment was installed inside the courthouse, and although the trial judge
prohibited the taking of pictures inside the courtroom itself, his order was
openly flouted. Indeed, sound and motion picture equipment was plainly vis-
ible in the balcony of the courtroom throughout the trial.
Despite sequestration during the trial, the jury obviously was exposed to
massive pretrial publicity. Moreover, each day as the jurors walked up the
courthouse steps, they passed through a gauntlet of reporters, newsboys, and
ordinary citizens making bets on the case, shouting "Burn Hauptmann," and
selling souvenir reproductions of the kidnap ladder. The jurors ate in a public
[Vol. 57:235
MEDIA IN THE COURTROOM
Bar Association formally adopted a rule in direct response to the adverse
impact of massive media coverage in that world famous case:
Proceedings in court should be conducted with fitting dignity and
decorum. The taking of photographs in the court room, during ses-
sions of the court or recesses between sessions, and the broadcasting
of court proceedings are calculated to detract from the essential dignity
of the proceedings, degrade the court and create misconceptions with
respect thereto in the mind of the public and should not be permitted2
In 1952 a special committee of the ABA produced a report which caused
the House of Delegates to amend this canon to proscribe televising court
proceedings as well. 4 A majority of states adopted the substance of this
rule."' The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure also prohibits camera
coverage of trials: "The taking of photographs in the court room during
the progress of judicial proceedings or radio broadcasting of judicial pro-
ceedings from the court room shall not be permitted by the court."'247
A recent poll of practicing lawyers reflected once again the overwhelm-
ing sentiment against allowing proceedings to be televised:
dining room, separated only by a cloth screen from reporters discussing the
case over lunch. Even during deliberations, the jury could hear the mob that
had gathered outside the courthouse screaming "Kill Hauptmann! Kill
Hauptmann!"
2 ABA CANONS F JUDICIAL ETHICS No. 35, reprinted in 62 ABA REP. 1123,1134-35 (1937).
2,5 77 ABA REP. 110, 257 (1952). The Canon was recodified as 3A(7) of the Code of Judicial
Conduct which provides:
A judge should prohibit broadcasting, televising, recording, or taking
photographs in the courtroom and areas immediately adjacent thereto during
sessions of court or recesses between sessions, except that a judge may
authorize:
(a) the use of electronic or photographic means for the presentation of
evidence, for the perpetuation of a record, or for other purposes of judicial
administration;
(b) the broadcasting, televising, recording or photographing of investitive,
ceremonial, or naturalization proceedings;
(c) the photographic or electronic recording and reproduction of appropriate
court proceedings under the following conditions:
(i) the means of recording will not distract participants or impair the dignity
of the proceedings;
(ii) the parties have consented, and the consent to being depicted or re-
corded has been obtained from each witness appearing in the recording and
reproduction;
(iii) the reproduction will not be exhibited until after the proceeding has
been concluded and all direct appeals have been exhausted; and
(iv) the reproduction will be exhibited only for instructional purposes in educa-
tional institutions.
ABA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT No. 3A(7) (1980).
246 Pequignot, From Estes to Chandler: Shifting the Constitutional Burden of Courtroom
Cameras to the States, 9 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 315, 319 (1981); Petition of Post-Newsweek Sta-
tions, Florida, Inc., 370 So. 2d 764 (Fla. 1979).
24I FED. R. CaRM. P. 53.
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Lawyers' attitudes toward statements regarding televised
courtroom proceedings, United States, 1979
[NOTE: this table presents the findings of a survey done by Kane,
Parsons and Associates for the American Bar Association Journal.
Telephone interviews were conducted with a random sample of 601






Television cameras in the
courtroom would tend to
distract witnesses
TV cameras in the court-
room should be discour-
aged as they will be used
to show the more sensa-
tional aspects of a trial
only
The use of televised pro-
ceedings should not be
allowed as they will en-
courage lawyers and




the public concept of our
system of justice
Televised courtroom pro-
ceedings should be en-
couraged because citizens












55 20 15 8 2
47 23 20 8 2
39 25 20 14 2
16 21 26 34 3
15 18 26 40 1
9 11 19 59 2
Indeed, as recently as September 1980, the Judicial Conference of the
United States adopted a rule prohibiting the taking of photographs and
the use of radio or television broadcasting in the courtroom:
The taking of photographs and operation of tape recorders in the
Lawyers Aren't Convinced that TV Belongs in Courtrooms, 65 A.B.A.J. 1306, 1308 (1979).
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courtroom or its environs during the progress of or in connection with
judicial proceedings ... is prohibited. A judge may, however, permit
(1) the use of electronic or photographic means for the presentation
of evidence or the perpetuation of a record, and (2) the broadcasting,
televising, recording, or photographing of investitive, ceremonial, or
naturalization proceedings."9
Several arguments have been made respecting the adverse impact of
cameras in the courtroom. The major points were succinctly set out by
columnist James Reston:
They would be a distracting influence and make it more difficult
to get the truth out of witnesses, whose powers of observation, recollec-
tion and communication are already limited in -the emotional stresses
of a courtroom.
They would encourage jurors to think about themselves on camera
rather than concentrating on the evidence, and tempt lawyers to play
to the cameras rather than to the jury.
While they would extend the process of justice to a much wider
audience, they would in many if not most cases give that audience
a distorted picture of the proceedings.'
A case illustrating the potential for disruption by cameras in the court-
room is that of Billie Sol Estes, a well-known financier and friend of
Presidents who was convicted of swindling numerous farmers." The Texas
Judicial Canons allowed the trial judge, in his discretion, to direct the
televising and photographing of court proceedings.' The difficulty in Estes
was that the proceedings looked very much like a circus.' "Massive
pretrial publicity total[ed] 11 volumes of press clippings . . .
[At pretrial proceedings when the case was first called for trial,]
all available seats in the courtroom were taken and some 30 persons
stood in the aisles.... [A]t least 12 cameramen were engaged in the
courtroom throughout the hearing .... Cables and wires were snaked
across the courtroom floor, three microphones were on the judge's
bench and others were beamed at the jury box and the counsel table.
[All parties] conceded that the activities ... led to considerable disrup-
tion of the hearings.m
29 Revised Report of the Judicial Conference Committee on the Operation of the Jury System
on the "Free Press-Fair Trial" Issue, supra note 140, at 535-36.
Reston, Television And The Courts, N.Y. Times, Jan. 28, 1981, S A, at 23, col. 5. See
also Tongue and Lintott, The Case Against Television in the Courtroom, 16 WILLAMETTE
L. REV. 777 (1980). (Justice Tongue sits on the Oregon Supreme Court.)
"' Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965). Estes continues to have difficulties with the criminal
justice system. See Horton v. United States, 646 F.2d 181 (5th Cir. 1981) (affirming convic-
tion for defrauding United States).
Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 535 (1965).
z See id. at 536. See also Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 799 (1975). The issue also
arose in the Sam Sheppard case, though the disposition there primarily rested on the adverse
pretrial publicity. See text accompanying notes 51-61 supra.
381 U.S. 532, 535 (1965).
Id. at 535-36.
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Though this extreme situation was altered somewhat at trial, 6 a good
deal of television coverage occurred, and this coverage was broadcast the
same day it was taken. 57 According to the Court, on one occasion the
video tapes were rebroadcast in place of the "late movie".'
When the case came before the Supreme Court, the defendant claimed
that his due process rights had been violated by the televising and broad-
casting of the pretrial proceedings and the trial. Six separate opinions
were written. Justice Clark's opinion for the Court established what ap-
peared to be a per se rule that the televising of proceedings, over the
objection of the defendant, denied due process rights. In response to the
state's contention that no prejudice had been shown by the petitioner
as resulting from the televising, Justice Clark stated: "Television in its
present state and by its very nature, reaches into a variety of areas in
which it may cause prejudice to an accused. Still one cannot put his finger
on its specific mischief and prove with particularity wherein he was
prejudiced."'259 Chief Justice Warren, joined by Justices Douglas and
Goldberg, made the point even more directly, stating
[t]hat the televising of criminal trials is inherently a denial of due
process.... The record in this case presents a vivid illustration of
the inherent prejudice of televised criminal trials and supports our
conclusion that this is the appropriate time to make a definitive ap-
praisal of television in the courtroom.'
This view of a per se rule commanded the four votes indicated above.26 '
Four Justices dissented,6 ' finding that there was no per se constitu-
tional rule against the introduction of television into a courtroom. They
also found that there had been no showing that under the circumstances
of the particular trial the petitioner was denied his constitutional rights.'
The real issue, therefore, centered on the position of the ninth Justice,
Ultimately, the televising of the trial itself was restrained compared to the pretrial
proceedings.
A booth had been constructed at the back of the courtroom which was painted
to blend with the permanent structure of the room. It had an aperture to
allow the lens of the cameras an unrestricted view of the courtroom. All televi-
sion cameras and newsreel photographers were restricted to the area of the
booth when shooting film or telecasting.




Id. at 544.Id. at 552 (Warren, C. J., concurring).
26 While Justice Harlan concurred, he did not subscribe to the Court's per se analysis.
Id. at 588-90 (Harlan, J., concurring).
2 Id. at 601.
Id. at 602 (Stewart, J., dissenting, joined by Black, Brennan and White, JJ.). Even
the dissenters recognized that "the introduction of television into a courtroom is, at least
in the present state of the art, an extremely unwise policy. It invites many constitutional
risks, and it detracts from the inherent dignity of the courtroom." Id. at 601.
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Justice Harlan. He concurred in the Court's judgment, but in his separate
opinion he left some doubt as to how much of Justice Clark's opinion he
supported. In Justice Harlan's view, although television in the courtroom
could have negative effects, prohibiting it could preclude states' "pro-
cedural experimentation."2" Justice Harlan concluded:
[T]here is no constitutional requirement that television be allowed in
the courtroom, and, at least as to a notorious criminal trial such as
this one, the considerations against allowing television in the courtroom
so far outweigh the countervailing factors advanced in its support as
to require a holding that what was done in. this case infringed the fun-
damental right to a fair trial assured by the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.'
The confusion as to the Estes holding was fueled, to a large extent,
by the egregious facts presented there. One federal court characterized
Justice Harlan's opinion as favoring the per se rule "in a 'notorious' case
which is 'heavily publicized' and 'highly sensational.' Thus, Estes can be
construed as standing for the proposition that television coverage of a
'notorious' criminal case absent the defendant's validly obtained consent
is a per se violation of due process." '266 Other judges viewed Estes as being
limited to the situation in which the presence of cameras in the court-
room actually was shown to have prevented a fair trial,"7 while still others
took a very broad view of Estes."'
With this shaky constitutional precedent in mind, the states proceeded
cautiously. Many states, following the lead of the American Bar Associa-
tion, refused to allow any electronic coverage. Others limited such
coverage to particular kinds of proceedings, such as appellate arguments.
Id. at 587 (Harlan, J., concurring).
Id. at 587, 591 (emphasis added). Justice Harlan added:
In the context of a trial of intense public interest, there is certainly a strong
possibility that the timid or reluctant witness, for whom a court appearance
even at its traditional best is a harrowing affair, will become more timid or
reluctant when he finds that he will also be appearing before a 'hidden au-
dience' of unknown but large dimensions. There is certainly a strong possibility
that the 'cocky' witness having a thirst for the limelight will become more
'cocky' under the influence of television. And who can say that the juror who
is gratified by having been chosen for a front-line case, an ambitious prosecutor,
a publicity-minded defense attorney, and even a conscientious judge will not
stray, albeit unconsciously, from doing what 'comes naturally' into pluming
themselves for a satisfactory television 'performance'?
Id. at 591.
2" Zaehringer v. Brewer, 635 F.2d 734, 738 (8th Cir. 1980). Enormous problems would
be created, however, if trial judges actually had to determine which cases were sufficient-
ly "notorious:'
2" State v. Newsome, 177 N.J. Super. 221, 226-28, 426 A.2d 68, 71-72 (1980).
'" See Bradley v. Texas, 470 F.2d 785, 787 (5th Cir. 1972) ("Television coverage of a trial
is considered inherently prejudicial .... "). But see Merola, Who'd Beat on a Suspect While
the Camera's Running?, TV GUIDE, July 25, 1981, at 17 (Mr. Merola is the district attorney
of Bronx County in New York City.).
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A few began to allow television coverage of criminal trials.269 In Chandler
v. Florida,70 which ultimately came before the Supreme Court, the state
had chosen to go farther than any other by allowing television coverage
of criminal trials, even over the specific objection of the defendant.
The state of Florida embarked on an ambitious pilot program in 1975
for televising one civil and one criminal trial under specific guidelines
requiring the consent of all parties."' After this program ended in 1978,
the state supreme court reviewed briefs, reports, and studies, including
its own survey of interested parties, and concluded that "on balance there
[was] more to be gained than lost by permitting electronic media coverage
of judicial proceedings subject to standards for such coverage.""ns The
Florida Supreme Court then promulgated a permanent canon allowing
for such coverage.
2 73
The implementing guidelines required by the Florida canon specified
in detail the type of equipment to be used and the nianner of its use. 4
As noted by Chief Justice Burger, the restrictions are designed to
eliminate any adverse impact which might otherwise be present:
[N]o more than one television camera and only one camera technician
are allowed. Existing recording systems used by court reporters are
used by broadcasters for audio pickup. Where more than one broad-
cast news organization seeks to cover a trial, the media must pool
coverage. No artificial lighting is allowed. The equipment is positioned
in a fixed location, and it may not be moved during trial. Videotaping
equipment must be remote from the courtroom. Film, videotape, and
lenses may not be changed while the court is in session. No audio
recording of conferences between lawyers, between parties and
counsel, or at the bench is permitted. The judge has sole and plenary
discretion to exclude coverage of certain witnesses, and the jury may
not be filmed. The judge has discretionary power to forbid coverage
whenever satisfied that coverage may have a deleterious effect on
the paramount right of the defendant to a fair trial. The Florida
See Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 565 n.6 (1981); see also In re Petition of Post-
Newsweek Stations, Fla., Inc., 370 So. 2d 764, 786-91 app. 2 (Fla. 1979) (reprinting National
Center for State Courts, Television in the Courtroom: Recent Developments, Feb. 7, 1979);
see also Carter, Television in the Courtrooms, 5 STATE CT. J. 6 (1981).
270 449 U.S. 560 (1981).
"' Petition of Post-Newsweek Stations, Fla., Inc., 327 So. 2d 1, 2 (Fla. 1976).
Petition of Post-Newsweek Stations, Fla., Inc., 370 So. 2d 764, 780 (Fla. 1979). This
opinion contains an excellent discussion of the various arguments to be made as to the
desirability of televising criminal trials. See id. at 779-81.
FLA. CANON 3A(7). This canon provides:
Subject at all times to the authority of the presiding judge to (i control
the conduct of proceedings before the court, (ii) ensure decorum and prevent
distractions, and (iii) ensure the fair administration of justice in the pending
cause, electronic media and still photography coverage of public judicial pro-
ceedings in the appellate and trial courts of this state shall be allowed in ac-
cordance with standards of conduct and technology promulgated by the
Supreme Court of Florida.
' 370 So. 2d at 783-85 app. 1, A.
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Supreme Court has the right to revise these rules as experience dic-
tates, or indeed to bar all broadcast coverage of photography in
courtrooms.' 5
The defendants in Chandler had been charged with the relatively routine
offenses of conspiracy to commit burglary, grand larceny, and possession
of burglary tools. While the case was hardly notorious along the lines
of Estes, it was not ordinary either. At the time of their arrest, the defen-
dants were Miami Beach police officers. A television camera was in place
for one afternoon during which the state presented the trial testimony
of its chief witness. No coverage occurred in connection with the defen-
dants' case. The defendants argued that the Florida rule was unconstitu-
tional on its face and as applied, but the arguments were rejected at the
state court level."6 The defendants in argument before the United States
Supreme Court read the Estes case as announcing a per se constitutional
rule that televising of any portion of a criminal trial without the defen-
dant's consent is a denial of due process."
Chief Justice Burger, focusing on Justice Harlan's swing vote in Estes,
2 7 8
concluded:
[E]stes is not to be read as announcing a constitutional rule barring
still photographic, radio and television coverage in all cases and under
all circumstances. It does not stand as an absolute ban on state ex-
perimentation with an evolving technology, which, in terms of modes
of mass communication, was in its relative infancy in 1964, and is,
even now, in a state of continuing change.7 9
While at least two members of the Court, Justices Stewart and White,
ihought that Estes did announce a per se rule and should be overruled, 0
no member of the Court281 was willing in 1981 to accept such a per se
rule. As stated by the Chief Justice: "The risk of juror prejudice is pre-
sent in any publication of a trial, but the appropriate safeguard against
such prejudice is the defendant's right to demonstrate that the media's
449 U.S. at 566.
,, Id. at 567-68. See Chandler v. State, 366 So. 2d 64, 69 (Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (per curiam),
cert. denied, 376 So. 2d 1157 (Fla. 1979) (per curiam), affd, 449 U.S. 560 (1981).
" Id. at 570.
" See notes 264-68 & accompanying text supra.
• 449 U.S. at 573-74. The Chief Justice emphasized the limitations imposed by Justice
Harlan in his opinion: "'At the present juncture, I can only conclude that televised trials,
at least in cases like this one, possess such capabilities for interfering with the even course
of the judicial process that they are constitutionally banned.' " Id. at 573 (quoting 381 U.S.
at 595-96 (Harlan, J., concurring)) (emphasis added by Chief Justice Burger).
' 449 U.S. at 583 (Stewart, J., concurring) ("Although concurring in the judgment, I
cannot join the opinion of the Court because I do not think the convictions in this case
can be affirmed without overruling Estes v. Texas."); id. at 587 (White, J., concurring) ("I
think Estes is fairly read as establishing a per se constitutional rule against televising any
criminal trial if the defendant objects. So understood, Estes must be overruled to affirm
the judgment below:').
511 Justice Stevens did not participate in the case. Id. at 583.
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coverage of his case ... compromised the ability of the particular jury
that heard the case to adjudicate fairly.28 2
The Court acknowledged that since Estes had been decided, many states
had allowed experimentation and many of the negative factors found in
Estes-cumbersome equipment, cables, poor lighting, and the number of
camera technicians -were no longer of great concern.2' The Court thus
decided that "no one has been able to present empirical data sufficient
to establish the mere presence of the broadcast media inherently has an
adverse effect .... ,,2' Because the defendants were not able to offer
any evidence of particular prejudice,285 the Court held that, unlike the
situation in Estes, there was no showing that the trial was in any way
affected by television coverage. 21
The difficulty with the approach of the Court is that few defendants
will ever be able to show prejudice resulting from the television cameras,
apart from the spectacular case such as Estes.287 More importantly, it is
not clear to this writer why such a showing should have to be made by
the defendant. This is not a case where severe first amendment restric-
tions are being imposed on the media. The sources of information are
not being limited or cut off. No punishment of any sort is being meted
out for the content of the reporting. Can anyone doubt that-at least
in some cases-the televising of proceedings will have some serious im-
pact on the trial participants, 8 an impact which will not be tangible and
will not likely lead to appealable issues?
If the central thesis is that televising of criminal proceedings will
educate the public far better than other forms of coverage, does not this
assertion prove too much? If it is educational in the context in which a
defendant stands to be deprived of his or her liberty, is it not also educa-
tional for the public to understand how the United States Supreme Court
operates? The Court does not, however, allow electronic media coverage
2 Id. at 575.
" Id. at 576-77.
.84 Id. at 578-79. The Chief Justice recognized that the "data thus far assembled" were
"limited" and "non-scientific." Id. at 576 n.11.
" Id. at 568. The only evidence was to the contrary because at voir dire the jurors
were asked if the presence of the camera would in any way compromise their ability to
consider the case. Id. at 567.
28 Id. at 582. See Platte, TV in the Courtroom: Right of Access?, 3 COM. & L. 11 (1981.
8 Of course, even after Chandler, restrictions on television may be legitimately imposed
so as to control prejudicial publicity and protect the defendant's right to a fair trial. The
obvious example is the notorious Atlanta child murder trial which, the trial judge ruled,
could not be televised. The court there held that under the Georgia rules consent of all
parties was a prerequisite, but in any case, televising of the proceedings would not be
in the public interest in view of the potential harm "to those children and families who
were adversely affected by the ordeal" in the city of Atlanta. State v. Williams, [1981]
29 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 2516.
2 As Justice White noted in Chandler, "the majority does not underestimate or minimize
the risks of televising criminal trials over a defendant's objections. I agree that those risks
are real and should not be permitted to develop into the reality of an unfair trial." 449
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of appellate arguments before it.' 9 The Court in Chandler did not res-
pond to these issues, but again stressed the importance of media coverage
of criminal trials. Despite the importance of such coverage, the Court's
focus on it seems to miss the mark.
In fairness to the Court, it did make clear that there was no constitu-
tional right of media access with respect to electronic coverage of trials.
Instead, relying on the Florida rules, it wrote that trial judges would
have to be vigilant to make sure no prejudice was suffered by defendants
in these televised cases."0
In many respects, Chandler is a seminal case. Reversing the traditional
legal view of electronic coverage of trials, the Court refused to adopt
a per se rule against such coverage. 1 It is true that the Court also did
not establish any constitutional right of access regarding electronic
coverage, but made explicit that the key was a showing of specific pre-
judice to the defendant. This showing will be a difficult one to make ab-
sent a circuslike atmosphere. 2 The ruling in Chandler is, thus, a very
U.S. at 588-89 (White, J., concurring). See also the comments of Justice Stewart in 14 THIRD
BRANCH 3 (1982):
I think a good argument can be made against televising the proceedings
in a trial court, the argument being that the televising of such proceedings
would distort the administration of justice, would distort the actions of the
witnesses and the members of the jury and even the judge, conscious as they
would be that they were not just in a courtroom but in everybody's living room.
For an interesting exchange on this point by two practicing lawyers, see Allied Educa-
tional Foundation, Television in the Courtroom-Limited Benefits, Vital Risks?, 3 CoM. &
L. 30 (1981) (educational conference).
' Even at the swearing-in ceremony of Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, only reporters
and artists were allowed to record the event in accordance with the Supreme Court's policy
banning television, tape-recording, and picture-taking of proceedings. Washington Post, Sept.
25, 1981, S A, at 3, col. 1 (reprinted in the Bloomington Herald-Telephone, Sept. 26, 1981,
S 1, at 3, col. 1). At this time an intense controversy exists in the California Supreme Court.
Despite strenuous objections from two Justices, the California court has now agreed to
allow cameras to film oral arguments for the first time in the Court's history. Chief Justice
Byrd noted that the court wished to treat litigants fairly while "mak[ing] court proceedings
more open and understandable to the public:' Hager, Cameras Allowed to Enter Supreme
Court, Los Angeles Times, Sept. 4, 1981, S 1, at 3, col. 5. The dissenting Justices, however,
stated that "'it is regrettable that a majority of the members of this court have yielded
to the persistence of an entertainment media: . . . 'As a result, this temple of justice
is being transformed into a theater, and lawyers and justices are to be the actors.'" Id.
at 3-21, col. 5.
449 U.S. at 574.
"The Florida guidelines place on trial judges positive obligations to be on guard to pro-
tect the fundamental right of the accused to a fair trial.... [lit is significant that Florida
requires that objections of the accused to coverage be heard and considered on the record
by the trial court." Id. at 577.
"I Tornquist & Grifall, Television in the Courtroom: Devil or Saint? 17 WILLAMETTE L.
REV. 345 (1981); Zimmerman, Overcoming Future Shock: Estes Revisited, orA Modest Proposal
for the Constitutional Protection of the News-Gathering Process, 1980 DUKE L.J. 641.
2 See Zimmerman, supra note 291. One reporter reviewed the evidence and received
these quotes from judges and lawyers: "'I've yet to see how they detract from the ad-
ministration of justice' "; "'it's worked better than we anticipated' "; "'after two or three
minutes, everybody in the courtroom forgets the cameras and the mikes are there.'" Lind-
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broad victory for the media."3 Without any showing by the media of a
great need to broadcast the proceedings or a showing that such pro-
ceedings would not be inherently prejudicial, the Court recognized the
importance of open access absent a compelling showing of prejudice by
the defendant. 4 The impact of Chandler has already been widespread.
Numerous states have adopted rules paralleling the Florida experiment," s
and as the technology improves one expects further experimentation. 6
CONCLUSION
There has always been and will continue to be a great public interest
in criminal trials. These events are newsworthy and central to the
democratic process and need to be fully and freely reported by the various
news media. Within the last decade the Supreme Court has strongly ac-
cepted this view, moving away from an occupation with the sixth amend-
ment and fourteenth amendment rights of the accused on trial and toward
the legitimate interest of the media to open access to criminal trials. In-
stead of merely deferring to a claim of potential prejudice to the trial
rights of the defendant, the Court has become greatly concerned with
the impact of restrictions on the dissemination of information under the
first amendment.
The position of the Court makes a good deal of sense in the first two
areas discussed in this article. Prior restraint orders should be virtually
impossible to obtain, 7 as these orders completely cut off the media from
the news events. Similarly, closure orders should only be granted in the
rarest of circumstances. In this sense Richmond Newspapers is right, but
Gannett is wrong. If the press cannot be routinely shut out from trials,
sey, After 5 Years, Judges and Lawyers See Courts Adjusting to the Camera's Eye, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 7, 1981, at 6, col. 1.
Cf. Pequignot, supra note 246.
It is surprising and disappointing that the Court was not willing to evaluate the various
interests involved; instead it deferred to the media's claims. One would have hoped for
a test somewhat parallel to that used in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), a case
in which the Court discussed the procedural safeguards required under the due process
clause. There the Court looked to three factors (private interest, risk of erroneous depriva-
tion, the government's interest) in reaching its determination of the due process mandate.
Id. at 335. In Chandler the Court did not engage in such a weighing process.
11 Tornquist & Grifall, supra note 291; Erickson, COLORADO LAWYER, Sept. 1981, at 2199,
2200, indicates that 31 states now permit television and camera coverage of trial or ap-
pellate proceedings. For a good discussion of the manner in which this evolution has occur-
red, see Carter, supra note 269. The proposed Illinois rules are typical of the new trend.
Section 61(c)(24) of the Supreme Court Rules as passed by the Illinois State Bar Associa-
tion would allow the taking of photographs and broadcasting or televising of court pro-
ceedings "subject to conditions imposed by authority of the presiding judge."
For a good discussion of the great improvements in the technology in this area, see
Loewen, Cameras in the Courtroom: A Reconsideration, 17 WASHBURN L.J. 504 (1978).
They may now be impossible to obtain under any circumstances, in light of the various
concurring opinions in Nebraska Press. See notes 86-93 & accompanying text supra.
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it is difficult to understand why no strong showing need be made by the
trial judge in the vital pretrial setting.
The other actions taken in this field by the Supreme Court are far less
defensible. When the press is not being kept away from the proceedings,
when they are free to report the important facts of the subject incident,
as well as the pretrial hearings and the trial, the Court should be reluc-
tant to disregard other state interests. The privacy of rape victims and
the goal of the state in keeping juvenile and judicial inquiry matters con-
fidential are significant. On the other hand, it is a subtle argument, in-
deed, to contend that first amendment interests are seriously affected
by forbidding the reporting of the names of victims of crimes, juvenile
delinquents, or judges not yet determined to have acted improperly. Of
even greater concern is the Court's ruling in the televised trial case where
the states were given much discretion, though questions regarding the
limited educational value of such broadcasting and the adverse impact
on the trial process were expressed. 8
In spite of the fears stated by many journalists,' the media have fared
quite well before the Supreme Court when the question involved the
reporting of criminal trials. In many of these cases, the first amendment
was quite properly given great weight. In others, however, the unwill-
ingness of the Justices to evaluate other, conflicting interests is troubling.
"' As noted by the Chief Justice in Chandler, the Conference of State Chief Justices,
by a vote of 44 to 1, recently approved a resolution allowing the highest court of each
state to promulgate rules regulating radio, television, and other photographic coverage
of court proceedings. 449 U.S. at 564 n.4.
14 For the views of Carl Stern and Bob Woodward, see notes 20, 99 & 169 supra; see
also note 100 & accompanying text supra.
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